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Abstract
Blind signature schemes provide the functionality of a carbon copy envelope: The user
(receiver) puts his message into this envelope and hands it over to the signer (sender).
The signer in return signs the envelope and gives it back to the user who recovers
the original signed message out of the envelope. Security says that the signer remains
oblivious about the message (blindness), but at the same time the receiver cannot
output any additional message/signature pair (unforgeability). Classical applications
of blind signatures include e-cash and e-voting.
Blind signature schemes are an important cryptographic primitive and many construc-
tions have been proposed in the literature. These instantiations differ mainly in round
complexity, underlying computational assumptions, and the model in which the proof
of security is given. However, the minimal requirements for blind signatures in terms of
round complexity and computational assumptions without assuming setup assumptions
are unknown. This thesis addresses both of these questions.
For the study of the round complexity, this thesis investigates the possibility of proving
the security of a more general class of three-move blind signature schemes. We show
that finding security proofs for these schemes via black-box reductions in the standard
model is hard. Characteristic for this class is that it is publicly decidable from the
transcript if the user can derive a valid signature, or not.
Regarding the computational assumptions, this thesis first shows that the class of unique
blind signature schemes can be used to build oblivious transfer protocols in a black-
box way. These blind signature schemes have at most one signature per message and
public key. It is well known that oblivious transfer cannot be constructed from one-
way functions in a black-box fashion. Thus, this result also holds for (regular) blind
signature schemes.
Moreover, this thesis rules out black-box constructions of blind signature schemes from
one-way functions. In fact, this thesis rules out constructions from a random permuta-
tion oracle. This separation holds even for schemes signing 1-bit messages that achieve
security only against honest-but-curious behavior.

Zusammenfassung
Blinde Signaturen ähneln einem Briefumschlag, der aus Kohlepapier besteht. Der Sig-
nierer (Sender) unterschreibt dabei auf diesem Kohlepapier, ohne das im Briefumschlag
liegende Dokument zu sehen. Danach erhält der Empfänger den Briefumschlag und
somit die unterschriebene Nachricht. Interactive Signaturverfahren zwischen einem
Sender und einem Empfänger nennt man blinde Signaturverfahren, wenn der Sender
(Signierer) nicht “sieht”, welche Nachricht er unterschreibt (Blindheit). Gleichzeitig darf
der Empfänger nicht in der Lage sein, mehr unterschriebene Nachrichten auszugeben, als
Protokollausführungen stattfanden (Unfälschbarkeit). Typische Anwendungen dieser
Signaturverfahren sind unter anderem e-cash oder e-voting.
Blinde Signaturen stellen ein wichtiges Primitiv in der Kryptographie dar. Obwohl diese
Signaturverfahren seit vielen Jahren breit erforscht wurden, beruhen die bekannten Lö-
sungen entweder auf sehr starken Annahmen, oder weisen einen hohen Interaktions-
aufwand auf. Aus diesem Grund befasst sich diese Dissertation sowohl mit dem Inter-
aktionssaufwand, als auch mit den minimalen Annahmen von blinden Signaturen.
Diese Arbeit beweist, dass es für eine große Klasse von blinden Signaturverfahren, bei
denen höchstens drei Interaktionen zwischen dem Sender und dem Empfänger statt
finden, keinen Black-Box Beweis im Standardmodell gibt. Charakteristisch für diese
Klasse ist, dass man von der öffentlichen Kommunikation entscheiden kann, ob der
Empfänger eine gültige Signatur erhält, oder nicht.
Des Weiteren wird gezeigt, dass die Gruppe von eindeutigen blinden Signaturverfahren
in Oblivious-Transfer -Protokolle überführt werden kann. Diese Gruppe zeichnet sich
dadurch aus, dass jede Nachricht pro öffentlichem Schlüssel genau eine Signatur besitzt.
Von Oblivious-Transfer -Verfahren ist bereits bekannt, dass diese nicht aus one-way
Funktionen konstruiert (black-box ) werden kann. Somit gillt dieses Resultat ebenfalls
für blinde Signaturverfahren.
Ferner wird bewiesen, dass es keine black-box Konstruktionen von blinden Signaturen
basierend auf one-way Funktionen gibt. Dieses Ergebnis wird dahin gehend verall-
gemeinert, dass nicht nur Ansätze basierend auf einer zufälligen Permutation aus-
geschlossen werden können, sondern auch Protokolle, die einen 1-bit Nachrichtenraum
besitzen und nur Sicherheit gegen honest-but-curious Angreifer garantieren.

Contents
1 Introduction 1
2 Definitions 7
2.1 General Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.2 Blind Signature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.3 Security of Blind Signature Schemes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3 On the Impossibility of Three-Move Blind Signature Schemes 11
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
3.2 Hard Problems and Black-Box Reductions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
3.3 Warm Up: Impossibility Result for Vanilla Reductions . . . . . . . . . 18
3.4 Impossibility Result for Statistically Blind Signature Schemes . . . . . 27
3.5 Impossibility Result for Computationally Blind Signature Schemes . . . 40
4 Blind Signatures and Their Applications to Adaptive OT 49
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
4.2 Selective-Failure Blindness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
4.3 From Blindness to Selective-Failure Blindness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
4.4 Selective Failures and Adaptive Oblivious Transfer . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
5 On the Impossibility of Blind Signatures From One-Way Permutations 69
5.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
5.2 Overview of Our Techniques . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
5.3 Blind Signatures Relative to an Oracle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
5.4 Attacking Black-Box Constructions of Blind Signatures . . . . . . . . . 75
5.5 Extensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
References 86

1 Introduction
Blind signature schemes, introduced by Chaum [Cha83a, Cha84], are a widely-studied
primitive that allows a signer to interactively issue signatures for a user. Roughly, the
signer learns nothing about the message being signed (blindness) while the user can-
not compute any additional signatures without the help of the signer (unforgeability).
Classical applications of blind signatures include e-cash, where a bank signs coins with-
drawn by users, and e-voting, where an authority signs public keys that voters later
use to cast their votes. In both scenarios, the signing party learns nothing about the
coin (resp. the public key), while the receiver cannot create any additional signed coin
(resp. public key).
Many blind signature schemes have been proposed in the literature, e.g., [Cha83b,
JLO97a, PS00a, Abe01a, Bol03a, CKW04a, KZ05, Fis06a, Oka06a, HKKL07a, FS09,
AO09], with varying characteristics of security and efficiency. Arguably, the most promi-
nent example is the scheme by Chaum [Cha83b] shown in Figure 1.1. The basic idea
of the protocol is to blind the hash H(m) of the message m using a random value re.
The user then receives the value rH(m)d and simply divides out the value r obtaining
the signature H(m)d on the message m.
Signer S(N, d) User U((N, e),m)
pick a random value r ← Z∗N
x←−−−−−−−−−−−−−− x← re ·H(m) mod N
y ← xd mod N y−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ σ ← y · r−1 mod N
it holds σ = H(m)d mod N return (m,σ)
Figure 1.1: Chaum’s blind signature scheme using an RSA key-pair (sk, pk) = ((N, d), (N, e)),
a message m, and a hash function H.
The various blind signature schemes differ in round complexity, underlying computa-
tional assumptions, and the model in which the security proof is given. For example,
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many schemes [PS00b, Abe01b, BNPS03a, Bol03b, AO09] rely on the random oracle
heuristic [BR93], where a hash function is considered as a truly random function. It is
well-known, however, that a security proof in the random oracle model does not neces-
sarily imply security in the standard model when a random oracle is instantiated by an
efficient hash function [CGH98]. Therefore, alternative solutions are necessary. Several
blind signature schemes that achieve security in the standard model have also been pro-
posed [CKW04b, Oka06b, HK07, KZ08, AFG+10]. These instantiations differ in the
underlying number-theoretic assumptions and their round complexities. Constructions
based on general assumptions are also known [JLO97b, Fis06b, HKKL07b, FS09], but
the minimal assumptions in terms of round complexity and computational assumptions
without assuming setup assumptions are unknown.
Black-box Constructions and Reductions. In cryptography, most constructions are
based on simpler building blocks, called primitives, that are believed to be secure.
The underlying primitives are usually treated as a black-box in the sense that the
construction does not make any assumptions about its concrete realization. To show
that the construction is also secure, mainly black-box reduction techniques are applied.
The initial assumption is the insecurity of the construction. The reduction then uses
an algorithm that breaks the construction to solve the underlying primitive that was
believed to be secure. This, however, is a contradiction and thus, our assumption must
have been false. The security reduction is also black-box if it treats the underlying
primitive and/or the adversary as a black-box. For a more formal approach see the
paper of Reingold et al. [RTV04a]. The authors define different “flavors” of black-
box reductions depending on the “degree” of black-box access to the primitive and/or
adversary. Clearly, black-box constructions give only a limited view of the relation
between different primitives as no conclusions about non-black-box access can be made.
Nevertheless, this approach is well established, as most of the cryptographic proofs are
black-box and it is powerful enough to show the equivalence between all primitives
of private-key cryptography [Lam79, Lub92, IL89, ILL89, GL89, HILL99b, HRV10]
including digital signature schemes [NY89, Rom90].
Black-box Separations. In some cases, no known black-box reductions exist between
primitives. This raises the question if such constructions exist, or if there is a gap be-
tween the primitives. Impagliazzo and Rudich show in their seminal work that there
indeed exists a black-box separation between primitives [IR89]. The basic idea is to
demonstrate a world relative to which one of the primitives exists and the other does
not. This approach was used by [IR89] to show that there is no construction of a
secure key-agreement protocol (KA) based on one-way functions. This breakthrough
result basically defines two separate worlds into which cryptographic primitives can
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be divided: the “private-key” world that contains all those primitives that are equiv-
alent to one-way functions (OWFs), such as digital signatures (DS), pseudorandom
generators (PRGs), pseudorandom functions (PRFs), and private-key encryption, and
the “public-key” world that contains primitives such as trapdoor permutations, public-
key encryption (PKE), key-agreement (KA), private information retrieval (PIR), and
oblivious transfer (OT). Figure 1.2 shows the separations between the main primitives
(although many more separations are known).
TDP
PIR
TDF
KA
PKE
OT
OWP
OWF
/
/
/
Figure 1.2: This figure shows the relations among the different primitives [CHL06]. Arrows
signify black-box reductions, whereas crossed arrows denote black-box separations.
This technique has also been used to prove many other separation results, e.g., [Rud92,
Sim98, KST99, GKM+00, GT00, GMR01, Fis02].
The second approach for showing separation between two primitives are meta-reductions:
the basic idea is to “build a reduction against the reduction” [BV98, Cor02a, Bro06,
PV06b, Bro07, BMV08a]. The assumption that there exists a reduction R outlines the
starting point. By assumption, the reduction R with black-box access to any successful
adversary A breaks the underlying cryptographic problem. The difficulty is now to
design an algorithm that simulates the reduction and that simultaneously mimics an
adversary that “looks” good enough for the reduction. Such that at the end, the com-
bination of the reduction and meta-reduction solve the underlying problem directly.
This approach has been used to consider, for example in [PV06a, Bro07, BMV08b],
the impossibility of reductions from secure encryption or signatures to a given RSA
instance.
Contributions of this Thesis
In this thesis, we address both the round complexity and the minimal computational
assumptions for constructing blind signature schemes. We begin by giving the founda-
tions of blind signatures including the used notations in Chapter 2.
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Chapter 3 then deals with the round complexity of blind signatures in the standard
model. We prove the following theorem:
First Theorem. There is no black-box reduction from the unforgeability of a three-
move blind signature scheme (with signature-derivation checks) to any hard non-inter-
active computational problem.
First, we consider the large class of three-move blind signatures where blindness holds
in a statistical sense, i.e., where even an unbounded malicious signer cannot link execu-
tions of the issuing protocol to message/signature pairs; and where signature-derivation
checks exist, i.e., one can verify from the communication between both parties if the
honest user is able to derive a valid signature from the interaction. We then extend
our result to computationally-blind signature schemes. To prove this result, we have
to make some assumptions about the scheme. Theses assumptions basically came “for
free” in the statistical case. In particular, we must assume that unforgeability and
blindness of the scheme are somewhat independent. We omit the detail here and refer
the reader to Section 3.1.3 for a comprehensive discussion.
In Chapter 4 we take the first action towards identifying the minimal computational
assumption for blind signatures. We extend the idea of Camenisch et al. [CNS07]
who show how to construct an adaptive oblivious transfer protocol out of any unique
selective-failure blind signature scheme (in the random oracle model). Roughly speak-
ing, selective-failure blindness says that
(1) a malicious signer S∗ cannot force the user algorithm U to abort based on the
specific message and
(2) blindness should also hold even if the signer is able to learn that some executions
have aborted.
Uniqueness means that each message has only one signature per public key.
Obviously, if we manage to remove both additional properties (selective-failure blindness
and uniqueness), we would immediately obtain a separation between blind signatures
and OWF. This follows from the well-known result that oblivious transfer cannot be
constructed from one-way functions in a black-box fashion. Therefore, our first step
is to determine the minimal assumptions for a general transformation that turns any
blind signature scheme into a selective-failure one. Our transformation, however, is
not applicable to the construction of Camenisch et al. [CNS07] because it destroys the
uniqueness of the blind signature scheme. In Section 4.4.2, we show that it is nonetheless
possible to build an adaptive k-out-of-N oblivious transfer protocol out of any unique
blind signature scheme by applying our transformation. The proposed construction is a
modification of the protocol in [CNS07] and, because of the problems with uniqueness,
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we have to prove the security of this construction from scratch.
Second Theorem. If unique blind signature scheme exists in the random oracle
model, then there exists simulatable adaptive oblivious transfer.
At first glance, it seems that our protocol proves that blind signature cannot be con-
structed from one-way functions. This impression, however, is not quite true because
the construction is based on a very strong assumption: uniqueness. In particular, in
[FS10] we show that unique signatures cannot be constructed from trapdoor permu-
tations in a black-box fashion. Yet, this does not say anything about the ability of
constructing non-unique blind signature.
Nevertheless, in Chapter 5, we settle this question in the negative:
Third Theorem. There is no black-box construction of a blind signature scheme
from one-way functions.
Our result imposes no restrictions on the blind signature scheme and applies even to
schemes with imperfect completeness. Moreover, it is actually quite a bit more general
than the above theorem indicates. In particular, our impossibility result holds also for
constructions based on one-way permutations or random oracles, and even rules out
constructions of blind signature schemes for 1-bit messages that achieve security only
against honest-but-curious parties.
5
6
2 Definitions
2.1 General Definitions
Throughout this thesis, n ∈ N denotes the security parameter. Every algorithm A
is a probabilistic Turing machine that runs in time polynomial in n unless indicated
otherwise. Informally, we say that a function is negligible if it vanishes faster than
the inverse of any polynomial. We usually refer to such a function as negl(n). If S
is a set, then x ← S indicates that x is chosen uniformly at random over S (which
in particular assumes that S can be sampled efficiently). We remark that, even if
occasionally not mentioned, all algorithms in this thesis receive the security parameter
1n as an additional input.
2.2 Blind Signature
To define blind signatures formally, we introduce the following notation for interactive
execution between algorithms X and Y . By (a, b)← 〈X (x),Y(y)〉 we denote the joint
execution, where x is the private input of X , y defines the private input for Y , the
private output of X equals a, and the private output of Y is b. We write Y〈X (x),·〉∞(y)
if Y can invoke an unbounded number of executions of the interactive protocol with X
in sequential order. Accordingly, X 〈·,Y(y0)〉1,〈·,Y(y1)〉1(x) can invoke sequentially ordered
executions with Y(y0) and Y(y1), but interact with each algorithm only once.
Definition 2.2.1 (Blind Signature Scheme). A blind signature scheme consists of
a tuple of efficient algorithms BS = (KG, 〈S,U〉 ,Vf) where
Key Generation. The algorithm KG(1n) generates a key pair (sk, pk).
Signature Issuing. The joint execution of algorithm S(sk) and algorithm U(pk,m)
for messagem ∈ {0, 1}n generates an output σ of the user, (⊥, σ)← 〈S(sk),U(pk,m)〉,
where possibly σ = ⊥.
Verification. The algorithm Vf(pk,m, σ) outputs a bit b, indicating whether the sig-
nature is valid or not.
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It is assumed that the scheme is complete, i.e., for any (sk, pk)← KG(1n), any message
m ∈ {0, 1}n and any σ output by U in the joint execution of S(sk) and U(pk,m) we
have Vf(pk,m, σ) = 1.
We also consider blind signature schemes that have imperfect completeness:
Definition 2.2.2 (Imperfect Completeness). A blind signature scheme BS has im-
perfect completeness if with overwhelming probability in n ∈ N the following holds: For
(sk, pk)← KG(1n), any message m ∈ {0, 1}∗ and any σ output by U in the joint execu-
tion of S(sk) and U(pk,m) we have Vf(pk,m, σ) = 1.
2.3 Security of Blind Signature Schemes
Security of blind signature schemes requires two properties, unforgeability and blindness
[JLO97b, PS96].
2.3.1 Unforgeability
A malicious user U∗ against unforgeability tries to generate k + 1 valid message-
signatures pairs after at most k completed interactions with the signer, where the
number of interactions is adaptively determined by the user during the attack. The
blindness condition says that it should be infeasible for a malicious signer S∗ to decide
upon the order in which two messages m0 and m1 have been signed in two executions
with an honest user U .
Definition 2.3.1 (Unforgeability). A blind signature scheme BS = (KG, 〈S,U〉 ,Vf)
is unforgeable if for any efficient algorithm U∗ the probability that the experiment
ForgeBSU∗ evaluates to 1 is negligible (as a function of n), where
Experiment ForgeBSU∗(n) :
(sk, pk)← KG(1n)
((m1, σ1), . . . , (mk+1, σk+1))← U∗〈S(sk),·〉∞(pk)
Return 1 iff
mi 6= mj for i, j with i 6= j, and
Vf(pk,mi, σi) = 1 for all i = 1, 2, . . . , k + 1, and
at most k interactions with 〈S(sk), ·〉∞ were completed.
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2.3.2 Computational and Statistical Blindness
Blindness says that it should be infeasible for a malicious signer S∗ to decide which
of two messages m0 and m1 was signed first in two executions with an honest user U .
In general, this condition must hold, even if S∗ is allowed to choose the public key
maliciously.
Definition 2.3.2 (Blindness). A blind signature scheme BS = (KG, 〈S,U〉 ,Vf) is
computational blind (resp. statistical blind) if for any (efficient resp. unbounded) al-
gorithm S∗ working in modes find, issue and guess, the probability that the following
experiment BlindBSS∗ evaluates to 1 is negligibly close to 1/2, where
Experiment BlindBSS∗(n) :
(pk,m0,m1, stfind)← S∗(find, 1n)
b← {0, 1}
stissue ← S∗〈·,U(pk,mb)〉1,〈·,U(pk,m1−b)〉1(issue, stfind)
and let σb, σ1−b denote the (possibly undefined) local outputs
of U(pk,mb) resp. U(pk,m1−b).
set (σ0, σ1) = (⊥,⊥) if σ0 = ⊥ or σ1 = ⊥
b∗ ← S∗(guess, σ0, σ1, stissue)
return 1 iff b = b∗.
Definition 2.3.3 (Secure Blind Signature Scheme). A blind signature scheme BS
= (KG, 〈S,U〉 ,Vf) is secure if it is unforgeable and blind.
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3 On the Impossibility of
Three-Move Blind Signature
Schemes
3.1 Introduction
As already mentioned, the arguably most prominent examples of blind signatures are the
blind signature schemes by Chaum [Cha83b] based on RSA and the ones by Pointcheval
and Stern [PS00a] based on the discrete logarithm problem, RSA, and factoring. Both
approaches admit a security proof in the random oracle model, in the case of Chaum’s
scheme the “best” known security proofs currently even requires the one-more RSA
assumption [BNPS03b].
In this chapter we investigate the possibility of instantiating the random oracles in
the schemes by Chaum and by Pointcheval and Stern, and of giving a security proof
based on standard assumptions like RSA or discrete logarithm. Although both schemes
are different in nature we can subsume them under a more general pattern of blind
signature schemes, where
• blindness holds in a statistical sense, i.e., even an unbounded malicious signer
cannot link executions of the issuing protocol to message-signature pairs,
• the interactive signature issuing has three (or less) moves, and
• one can verify from the communication between a possibly malicious signer and
an honest user if the user is eventually able to derive a valid signature from the
interaction.
We note that the construction by Boldyreva [Bol03a] based on the one-more Gap Diffie-
Hellman problem in the random oracle model also obeys these three properties such that
any impossibility result immediately transfers to this scheme as well. The third prop-
erty, which we coin signature-derivation check, basically guarantees that blindness still
holds if the user fails to produce a signature in the postprocessing step, after the actual
interaction with the signer has been completed. Common notions of blindness do not
provide any security guarantee in this case (see Chapter 4 for detailed discussions).
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Figure 3.1: Meta-reduction technique: The black-box reduction R on the left hand side uses
the adversary AΣ against unforgeability to solve an instance y of the non-interactive problem.
The meta-reductionM on the right hand side then uses R to solve the problem from scratch,
i.e., by simulating AΣ without Σ. For this, the meta-reduction M exploits the blindness
property of the scheme.
3.1.1 The Idea Behind our Result
Given a blind signature scheme with the properties described above we can show that
for such schemes finding black-box reductions from successful forgers to any underlying
non-interactive cryptographic problem (like RSA, discrete-log, general one-wayness, or
collision-resistance) is infeasible. The key idea to our result is as follows. Assume that
we are given a three-move blind signature scheme as mentioned above and a reduction
R reducing unforgeability to a presumably hard problem (given only black-box access
to an alleged forger). Vice versa, if the problem is indeed infeasbile, then the reduction
therefore shows that the scheme is unforgeable.
Our approach is to show that the existence of a reduction R as above already violates
the assumption about the hardness of the underlying problem. Our starting point is
to design an oracle Σ with unlimited power and a “magic” adversary AΣ breaking the
unforgeability of the blind signature scheme with the help of Σ. By assumption, the
reduction R with access to AΣ is then able to break the underlying cryptographic
problem (see the left part of Figure 3.1). Note that, at this point, we are still in a
setting with an all-powerful oracle Σ and the non-interactive problem may indeed be
easy relative to this oracle, without contradicting the presumed hardness in the standard
model.
Now we apply meta-reduction techniques, as put forward for example in [BV98, Cor02b,
Bro06, PV06b], to remove the oracle Σ from the scenario. Given R we show how to
build a meta-reductionM (a “reduction for the reduction”) to derive an efficient solver
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for the problem, but now without any reference to the magic adversary and Σ (right
part of Figure 3.1). To this end, the meta-reduction M fills in for adversary AΣ and
simulates the adversary’s actions without Σ, mainly by resetting the reduction R ap-
propriately. Then we have eventually derived an algorithmMR solving the underlying
non-interactive problem in the standard model, meaning that the problem cannot be
hard. In other words, there cannot exist such a reduction R to a hard problem.1
At this point it seems as if we have not used the blindness property of the scheme and
that the idea would paradoxically also apply to regular signature schemes (for which
we know secure constructions based on any one-way function). This is not the case.
The blindness subtly guarantees that the meta-reduction’s simulation of the adversary
is indistinguishable from the actual behavior of AΣ, such that the success probabilities
of RAΣ and of MR are close. For these two cases to be indistinguishable, namely R
communicating with AΣ or with M, we particularly rely on the fact that blindness
holds relative to the all-powerful oracle Σ used by A, as in case of statistically-blind
signature schemes.
3.1.2 The Essence of our Meta-Reduction and Impossibility of
Random Oracle Instantiations
There are essentially two approaches in the literature to derive black-box separations like
ours. One class of black-box separation results (e.g., [IR89, Sim98, RTV04b]) basically
starts with an oracle Σ breaking any cryptographic primitive of type A, like a collision-
resistant hash function, but adds an oracle Π implementing another primitive of type
B like a one-way function (and which cannot be broken by Σ). Here, the cryptographic
primitives in question are usually treated as black-boxes.
The other approach uses meta-reductions [BV98, Cor02a, Bro06, PV06b, Bro07, BMV08a]
and usually treats the adversary as a black-box. In our case, we show that no black-
box reduction to arbitrary (non-interactive) cryptographic problems can exist. This
includes common assumptions like the RSA and discrete logarithm problem, but also
more general notions of one-way functions and collision-resistant hash functions. Com-
pared to oracle-based separations and previous meta-reduction techniques our result
gives the following two advantages:
1We consider very general reductions running multiple instances of the adversary in a concurrent and
resetting manner, covering all known reductions for blind signatures in the literature. Yet, since
the meta-reduction itself uses rewinding techniques, we somewhat need to restrict the reduction in
regard of the order of starting and finishing resetted executions of different adversarial instances
(called resetting with restricted cross-resets). This saves us from an exponential running time for
M. For example, any resetting reduction running only a single adversarial instance at a time obeys
our restriction.
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• Oracle separations involving a “positive” oracle Π implementing a primitive often
do not allow to make statements about the possibility of deriving schemes based
on concrete primitives such as RSA or discrete-log. The latter primitives have
other properties which could potentially be exploited for a security proof, like
homomorphic properties. This limitation does not hold for our results.
• Meta-reduction separations such as [PV06b, Bro07, BMV08a] consider the impos-
sibility of reductions from secure encryption or signatures to a given RSA instance.
Yet, they often fall short of providing any meaningful claim if other assumptions
enter the security proof, e.g., the result in [PV06b] does not hold anymore if two
RSA instances are given or an additional collision-resistant hash function is used
in the design. In comparison, our general approach covers such cases as we can
easily combine non-interactive problems P1, P2 into more complex problems like
P1∨P2 and P1∧P2, requiring to break one of the two problems and both of them,
respectively.
The latter advantage emerges because our meta-reduction plays off unforgeability against
blindness. This technique may be useful in similar settings where two or more security
properties are involved to provide stronger separation results for meta-reductions.
The broader class of problems ruled out by our meta-reduction also allows to make
meaningful claims when it comes to the possibility instantiating the random oracle in
the blind signature schemes. Namely, our separation indicates the limitations of hash
function options (assuming some restriction on the resets of the reductions, mentioned
in the previous section):
Any hash function whose security can be proven by black-box reduction to
hard non-interactive problems does not allow a black-box reduction from the
unforgeability of the blind signature scheme to hard non-interactive prob-
lems, such as RSA or discrete-logarithm.
This can be seen as follows. Any reduction from the unforgeability either breaks the
underyling non-interactive problem like RSA or discrete-log, or breaks some security
property of the hash function. The latter, in turn, yields a nested reduction from the
unforgeability of the blind signature scheme to the non-interactive problem on which
the hash function is based. One only needs to ensure that this nested reduction falls
within our admissible reset strategy. This is clearly true if the security property of
the hash function is given by a hard non-interactive problem itself, like one-wayness or
collision-resistance, or allows a suitable reduction to these problems or RSA, discrete-log
etc.
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3.1.3 Extension to Computational Blindness
In principle, our result extends to computationally-blind signature schemes but the
conditions are arguably more restrictive than in the statistical case. First, recall that
blindness needs to hold relative to the forgery oracle Σ, i.e., the powerful forgery or-
acle must not facilitate the task of breaking blindness. While this comes “for free”
in the statistical case, in the computational case one must assume that unforgeability
and blindness of the scheme are somewhat independent. This is true for instance for
Fischlin’s scheme [Fis06a], but there are also examples where blindness and unforge-
ability are correlated, as in Abe’s scheme [Abe01a] where unforgeability is based on the
discrete-log problem and blindness on the DDH problem.
Second, given that the scheme is computationally-blind relative to Σ we still rely on
the signature derivation check. One can easily design computationally-blind schemes
infringing this property, say, by letting the user sent a public key and having the signer
encrypt each reply (we are not aware of any counter example in the statistical case).
On the other hand, these signature derivation checks are very common, e.g., besides
the schemes above the ones by Okamoto [Oka06a] and by Fischlin [Fis06a] too have
this property.
Third, since we have to change the forgery oracle Σ for the computational case, we also
need a key-validity check which allows to verify if a public key has a matching secret
key (i.e., if there is a key pair with this public key in the range of the key generating
algorithm). For schemes based on discrete-logarithm this usually boils down to check
that the values are group elements. Given that these three conditions are met we show
that our techniques carry over to the computational case.
Related Work. In a sense, our results match the current knowledge about the round
complexity of blind signature schemes. Nowadays, the best upper bound to build (non-
concurrently) secure blind signatures are four moves for the standard model, i.e., neither
using random oracles nor set-up assumptions like a common reference string. This
is achieved by a protocol of Okamoto [Oka06a] based on the 2SDH bilinear Diffie-
Hellman assumption. Any schemes with three moves or less either use the random
oracle model [Cha83b, PS00a, Bol03a] or a commom reference string [Fis06a, HK07,
AO09, AFG+10].
We note that Lindell [Lin03] rules out any concurrently secure blind signature scheme in
the standard model, independently of any cryptographic assumption. Hence, it seems
that two-move schemes —which are concurrently secure by nature— are impossible in
the standard model. However, Lindell’s impossibility result only refers to the stronger
(black-box) simulation-based definition of blind schemes and can indeed be circum-
vented by switching to the common game-based definition, as shown by [HKKL07a].
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In contrast, our result holds with respect to game-based definitions and also covers
three-move schemes, thus showing that such blind signature schemes may be hard to
build even under this relaxed notion.
The recent results by Brown [Bro07] and Bresson et al. [BMV08a] show meta-reduction
based separations of the one-more RSA and one-more discrete-logarithm problem from
their regular counterparts. The conclusion in [BMV08a] is that it should be hard to find
a security proof for Chaum’s scheme and the Pointcheval-Stern schemes using only these
regular assumptions. As mentioned before, the meta-reductions in [Bro07, BMV08a] are
limited in the sense that they either cannot rewind (as in [Bro07]) or can only forward
the input RSA or discrete log problem (as in [BMV08a]). Our approach, however,
considers arbitrary hard non-interactive problems and is robust with respect to the
combination of several underlying assumptions.
We also remark that the well-known three-move lower bound for non-trivial zero-
knowledge [GK96] is not known to provide a lower bound for blind signature schemes.
The intuitively appealing idea of using the blind signature scheme as a commitment
scheme in such zero-knowledge proofs unfortunately results in proofs which require more
than three moves. This is even true if we start with a two-move blind signature scheme
where a “hidden” third move is required for the initial transmission of the signer’s pub-
lic key. In addition, the game-based notion of blind signatures is not known to yield
appropriate zero-knowledge simulators.
3.2 Hard Problems and Black-Box Reductions
In order to prove the security of a cryptographic protocol, usually reduction techniques
are used. A reduction from a cryptographic protocol to an underlying problem shows
that breaking the protocol implies breaking the underlying problem. A reduction is
black-box if it treats the adversary and/or the underlying primitive as an oracle. Rein-
gold et al. [RTV04b] call reductions which use both the adversary and the primitive
merely as an oracle fully-black-box, whereas semi-black-box reductions work for any ef-
ficient adversaries (whose code the reduction may access) as long as the primitive is
black-box.
In our case we only need the orthogonal requirement to semi-black-box reductions,
namely the reduction treats the adversary as an oracle but we do not make any assump-
tion about the representation of the underlying primitive. The reduction we consider
works for any kind of non-interactive primitive (i.e., in which one gets an instance as
input and outputs a solution without further interaction):
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Definition 3.2.1 (Hard Non-Interactive Problem). A non-interactive (cryptogra-
phic) problem P = (I, V ) consists of two efficient algorithms:
Instance generation. The instance generation algorithm I(1n) takes as input the
security parameter 1n and outputs an instance y ← I(1n).
Instance Verification. The instance verification algorithm V (x, y) takes as input a
value x as well as an instance y of a cryptographic problem and outputs a decision
bit b← V (x, y).
We call a cryptographic problem P hard if the following condition is fulfilled:
Hardness. We say that an algorithm A solves the cryptographic problem P if the
probability that A on input y ← I(1n) outputs x′ such that V (x′, y) = 1, is non-
negligible. We say that the problem P is hard if no efficient algorithm solves it.
Note that in the definition mentioned above we do not impose any completeness require-
ment on the cryptographic problem. The reason is that reductions from the security of
blind signatures must work for arbitrary problems and in particular to the ones with
non-trivial completeness conditions.
The notion of a non-interactive cryptographic problem clearly covers such popular cases
like the RSA problem, the discrete logarithm problem, or finding collisions for hash
functions. It also comprises more elaborate combination of such problems, e.g., if
P0, P1 are two non-interactive problems then so are P0 ∧ P1 and P0 ∨ P1 (with the
straightforward meaning requiring to solve both problems or at least one of them).
Very often in cryptography one builds protocols from several primitives P0, P1, . . . , Pk,
and one gets a sequence of reductions R1, . . . ,Rk to each primitive, but where the
reduction Ri has full control over the other primitives. For instance, a protocol may
rely on the RSA problem (P0) and collision-intractable hash functions (P1) and any
break either yields an RSA solver (R0) or a collision-finder (R1). But reduction R1
itself may take advantage of the fact that it knows the factorization for the RSA-part
(or even picks the modulus itself). Such cases are also subsumed by considering the
problem P which generates yi ← Ii(1n) for i = 1, 2, . . . , k and outputs a randomly
chosen instance.
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3.3 Warm Up: Impossibility Result for Vanilla
Reductions
To give some intuition about our technique we first consider the simpler case of vanilla
reductions. This type of reduction only runs a single execution with the adversary
(without rewinding) and, if communicating with an honest user, makes the user output
a valid signature with probability 1. This means that a vanilla reduction takes advantage
of the magic adversary and its output, instead of solving the problem on its own. We
then augment our result in the next section to deal with resetting reductions running
multiple adversarial instances.
3.3.1 Preliminaries
For our impossibility result we need another requirement on the blind signature scheme,
besides statistically blindness. This property says that one can tell from the public data
and communication between a malicious signer and an honest user whether the user is
able to compute a valid signature or not.
For instance, in Chaum’s scheme (see Figure 1.1 on Page 1) the honest user sends a
value y and receives z from the signer, and the user is able to compute a signature σ for
an arbitrary message m if and only if ze = y mod N . This is easily verifiable with the
help of the public key and the communication. The scheme of Pointcheval and Stern
implements the signature-derivation check already in the user algorithm.2 Analogous
derivation checks occur in the schemes by Okamoto and by Fischlin. More formally:
Definition 3.3.1 (Signature-Derivation Check). A blind signature scheme BS al-
lows (computational resp. statistical) signature-derivation checks if there exists an effi-
cient algorithm SDCh such that for any (efficient resp. unbounded) algorithm S∗ working
in modes find and issue the probability that the experiment SigDerCheckBSS∗,SDCh evaluates
to 1 is negligible, where
Experiment SigDerCheckBSS∗,SDCh(n) :
(pk,m, st)← S∗(find, 1n)
(⊥, σ)← 〈S∗(issue, st),U(pk,m)〉
where trans denotes the communication between S∗, U
c← SDCh(pk, trans)
return 1 if σ 6= ⊥ and c = 0, or if σ = ⊥ but c = 1.
2The signature derivation check is given by the user’s local verification a = gRhSye, where the values
a, r,R, S are exchanged during the signature issuing protocol and the values g, h, y are part of the
public key.
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In the computational case, if the above holds even if S∗ gets access to an oracle Σ then
we say that the scheme has computational signature-derivation checks relative to Σ. (In
the statistical case S∗ could simulate Σ internally, such that granting access to Σ is
redundant.)
The notion in some sense augments the blindness property of blind signature schemes to
the case that the user algorithm fails to produce a valid signature in the final local step.
The common notion of blindness does not provide any security in this case (because
the malicious signer does not receive any of the signatures if the user fails only then).
See [FS09] for more discussions and solutions. Here, the signature-derivation check
provides something stronger, as it can be efficiently performed by anyone and holds
independently of the user’s message.
Next we introduce a weaker notion than blindness which is geared towards our sepa-
ration result. Informally, a blind signature scheme has so-called transcript-independent
signatures if one cannot associate a transcript to a signature. This is formalized by
comparing signatures generated via an execution with a malicious signer and signa-
tures generated “magically” via an oracle Σ producing the signature for a message from
the public key and the transcript of the first execution. The intuition behind the fol-
lowing experiment is that the malicious signer has to distinguish whether the second
signature σb results from the signature issuing protocol, or if the oracle Σ derived the
signature σb from the transcript of the signature issuing protocol where the honest user
gets as input the message m0.
Definition 3.3.2 (Transcript-Independent Signatures). A blind signature scheme
BS has (computationally resp. statistically) transcript-independent signatures with re-
spect to Σ if for any (efficient resp. unbounded) algorithm S∗trans the probability that the
experiment trans-indBSS∗trans,Σ(n) evaluates to 1 is negligibly close to 1/2, where
Experiment trans-indBSS∗trans,Σ(n):
b← {0, 1}
(pk, st1,m−1,m0)← S∗,Σtrans(init, 1n)
st2 ← S∗,Σtrans〈·,U(pk,m−1)〉
1,〈·,U(pk,m0)〉1
(issue, st1)
let σ−1 and σ0 be the local outputs of the users in the two
executions (possibly σ−1 = ⊥ and/or σ0 = ⊥)
and let trans−1 be the transcript of the left execution
set m1 = m0 and compute σ1 ← Σ(pk, trans−1,m1)
set (σ−1, σ0, σ1) = (⊥,⊥,⊥) if σ−1 = ⊥ or σ0 = ⊥ or σ1 = ⊥
b∗ ← S∗,Σtrans(guess, st2,m−1, σ−1,mb, σb)
return 1 iff b = b∗.
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To define our generic forgery oracle Σ allowing A to break unforgeability we first outline
the idea for the case of Chaum’s blind signature scheme. Assume that the adversary
has already obtained a valid signature for some message m′ by communicating with
the signer. Let trans = (y, z) denote the transcript of this communication. Algorithm
Σ(pk, trans,m) for m 6= m′ then searches some randomness r such that the user’s first
message for m and r matches y in the transcript, i.e., H(m)re mod N = y. Such an r
exists by the perfect blindness and the signature-derivation check.3
The above example can be generalized to any blind signature scheme and the following
generic forgery oracle (which only depends on the blind signature scheme in question):
Definition 3.3.3 (Generic Forgery Oracle). For a statistically-blind signature scheme
BS the generic forgery oracle Σ(pk, trans,m) performs the following steps:
enumerate all values r such that
the user algorithm U(pk,m) for randomness r generates the same
transcript trans when fed with the same signer messages as in trans;
also store all signatures σ the user’s algorithm generates in these executions.
select a value r of the set at random and return the corresponding signature σ
(or return ⊥ if there is no such r).
The next proposition shows that every statistically blind signature scheme that allows
signature-derivation checks which has access to Σ has already transcript-independent
signatures.
Proposition 3.3.4. Every statistically blind signature scheme, which has statistical
signature-derivation checks, also has statistical transcript-independent signatures with
respect to the generic forgery oracle Σ.
Proof. Assume that there exists a signer S∗trans in experiment trans-indBSS∗,Σ(n) with the
generic forgery oracle Σ which outputs b∗ = b with non-negligible probability beyond
1/2. Then we construct an adversarial controlled signer S∗blind against the blindness
(with oracle access to Σ) as follows. Algorithm S∗blind invokes S∗trans(init, 1n) to get
(pk, st1,m−1,m0); it uses its access to Σ to answer any request of S∗trans to this ora-
cle. Algorithm S∗blind then outputs (pk,m−1,m0) according to the blindness experiment
and subsequently relays the entire communication between the two honest user in-
stances U and S∗trans. In the case that S∗blind obtains two undefined signatures from the
blindness experiment, i.e., (σ−1, σ0) = (⊥,⊥), then S∗blind returns (m−1,⊥,m0,⊥) to
3Note that blindness of Chaum’s scheme is only guaranteed if the user can verify that the exponent
e is relatively prime to ϕ(N), say, if e is a prime larger than N ; only then is guaranteed that the
function (·)e mod N really is a permutation.
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S∗trans. Otherwise, if both executions have been successful, then S∗blind executes S∗trans in
mode guess on input (st2,m−1, σ−1,m0, σ0) to obtain a bit b∗, where st2 is the state
returned by S∗trans(st1) after the interaction with the users. Algorithm S∗blind returns b∗
as its decisional bit.
For the analysis first observe that, if the left user instance yields a valid signature
σ−1 6= ⊥, then Σ too succeeds in producing a valid signature with overwhelming prob-
ability. This is true since the scheme allows signature-derivation checks and is statis-
tically blind. More specifically, call a tuple (pk, st1,m−1,m0) output by the transcript
adversary S∗trans bad if the probability (over the user’s randomness) that the user is able
to produce a valid signature from the communication with the transcript adversary for
m−1, but the signature-derivation check returns 0 or the transcript is not in the range
of possible transcripts for message m0, is non-negligible. Note that we can assume that
S∗trans is deterministic and chooses the bad tuple (pk, st1,m−1,m0) that maximizes the
probability. Then the probability that the signature-derivation check answers inconsis-
tently is negligible. The probability that the transcript is not in the range for message
m0 is negligible by the statistical blindness (else one could easily break blindness with
the help of S∗trans). It follows that there is no bad tuple.
Hence, given that the user picks randomness such that it can compute a signature,
except with negligible probability the transcript is also in the range for m0 and the
signature-derivation check indicates success. Since the answer of the signature-derivation
check only depends on the public key and the transcript, it follows that the user’s algo-
rithm is in principle also able to derive a signature for m0. Therefore, the forgery oracle
is able to find such a valid signature, except with negligible probability. From now we
can thus assume that the transcript adversary receives undefined signatures only if one
of the user instances fails to compute a signature.
Consider now the case where the bit b equals 0. The adversary S∗blind in this case
receives the second message-signature pair (m0, σ0) from the right execution with the
honest user U . It is easy to see that this experiment corresponds (almost) exactly to
the blindness experiment (taking into account that undefined signatures only depend
on success in the user instances). Thus, S∗blind performs an almost perfect simulation
from S∗trans’s point of view.
Now we investigate the case b = 1. In the blindness experiment the malicious signer
then communicates with the left user instance U(pk,m1) and with the right instance
U(pk,m0). In contrast, S∗trans in the transcript-independence experiment interacts on
the left side with a user instance that has been initialized with the message m0 (instead
of m−1) and obtains the second signature σ−1 from the oracle Σ for the same message
m1 = m0.
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It holds again that the oracle succeeds whenever the left user instance is able to compute
a signature (this follows immediately by construction of Σ since the set of possible
random inputs contains at least the actual randomness used by the honest user in the
left instance). Because the forgery oracle enumerates all possible randomness r such
that it can derive a valid signature and selects one of them at random, the output
distribution here is identical to the case of an interaction with the user. Thus, the
simulation of S∗trans is perfect in this case. But then we can conclude that if S∗trans
succeeds with non-negligible probability over 1/2, then S∗blind also succeeds with non-
negligible probability bounded away from 1/2.
We point out that the proof implicitly shows that, if the left user instance in the
transcript-independence experiment succeeds in producing a signature, then so does
the generic forgery oracle with overwhelming probability. Since this will be used again
later in the proof of the separation result we state this as a corollary more explicitly:
Corollary 3.3.5. For every statistically blind signature scheme BS with statistical sig-
nature-derivation checks, which is blind relative to the generic forgery oracle Σ, the
probability that in the transcript-independence experiment we have σ−1 6= ⊥ and σ1 = ⊥
after the run of Σ, is negligible.
Given the generic forgery oracle Σ we can now define the “magic” adversary which first
plays an honest users communicating with the signer once. If this single execution yields
a valid signature (which is certainly the case when interacting with the genuine signer,
but possibly not when interacting with the reduction), then the adversary generates
another valid message-signature pair without interaction but using Σ as a subroutine
instead.
Definition 3.3.6 (Magic Adversary). The magic adversary A for input pk and with
oracle access to the generic forgery oracle Σ and communicating with an oracle 〈S(sk), ·〉1
is described by the following steps:
pick random messages m′0,m′1 ← {0, 1}n
run an execution 〈S(sk),U(pk,m′0)〉 in the role of an honest user
to obtain σ′0 and let trans′0 be the corresponding transcript
if Vf(pk,m′0, σ′0) = 1 then let σ′1 ← Σ(pk, trans′0,m′1) else set σ′1 ← ⊥
return (m′0, σ′0,m′1, σ′1)
By the completeness of the blind signature scheme the magic adversary, when attacking
the honest signer, returns two valid message-signature pairs, with probability negligibly
close to 1 (there is a probability of at most 2−n that the adversary outputs identical
22
pairs for m′0 = m′1). We also remark that the magic adversary, when attacking the
actual scheme, applies the forgery oracle to derive a signature for the second message
using the transcript of the first signature issuing protocol.
3.3.2 Impossibility Result
The following theorem states that vanilla black-box reductions to (non-interactive)
cryptographic problems do not provide a meaningful security statement. That is, if
there was such a reduction then the underlying problem would already be easy. Since we
only deal with non-resetting reductions the claim even holds for schemes with arbitrary
round complexity (instead of three-move schemes):
Theorem 3.3.7. Let BS be a statistically blind signature scheme that allows statistical
signature-derivation checks. Then there is no vanilla black-box reduction from unforge-
ability of the blind signature scheme BS to a hard non-interactive problem.
We first illustrate the proof idea of Theorem 3.3.7. Assume that there was such a
reduction R taking an instance y of the problem as input and consider the magic
adversary. Unless the reduction is trivial and solves the problem without the help of
this adversary —in which case we are already done— the reduction R has to simulate
the adversary once to get two message-signature pairs. In particular, this means that,
with probability 1, the reduction provides “good” values from which an honest user can
derive a valid signature.
We now construct a meta-reduction M which mimics the adversarial behavior by
rewinding the reduction R after the first execution, and branching into another inde-
pendent execution (letting the reduction stay oblivious about the rewinding). By this,
the meta-reduction gets two valid message-signature pairs with non-negligible proba-
bility. Algorithm M forwards these two pairs to R. If the reduction returns a valid
solution x′ to y then so does M. But M does not rely on the magic adversary and
therefore provides an efficient solver for the underlying problem.
The difference between the generation of the second signature by the magic adversary
and the one by the meta-reduction is that the former is computed “out of the blue”,
while the latter is computed with the help of the reduction itself. Potentially, the
success of R may depend on a “trap” laid out in the public key and thatM’s strategy
of running two executions may defuse this trap. By the transcript-independence of the
signature, though, this difference is insignificant, and the reduction must also work if
playing againstM. We now turn to the formal proof:
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Meta-reduction M(y)
let (pk, stinit)← R(init, y)
let (msg1, stmsg1)← R(msg1, stinit)
choose m0 ← {0, 1}n choose m1 ← {0, 1}n
let (msg20, st0msg2)← U(msg2, pk,m0,msg1) let (msg21, st1msg2)← U(msg2, pk,m1,msg1)
let (msg30, st0msg3)← R(msg3, stmsg1,msg20) let (msg31, st1msg3)← R(msg3, stmsg1,msg21)
let σ0 ← U(finish, st0msg2,msg30) let σ1 ← U(finish, st1msg2,msg31)
output x′ ← R(final, st0msg3,m0, σ0,m1, σ1)
Figure 3.2: Meta-Reduction for Vanilla Reduction (three moves), where trans0 =
(msg1,msg2,msg3) denotes the transcript of the first execution.
Proof. For sake of readability we divide the reduction R into steps, according to the
black-box simulation of the magic adversary in whichR takes over the role of the signer:
in mode init the reduction outputs the public key pk and in mode msgi the reduction
creates the i-th protocol message msgi of the signer. After getting the adversary’s sig-
natures σ0, σ1 in the post-processing step final the reduction outputs a putative solution
x′ for its input y. In each step the reduction also outputs some state information which
is passed on to the next stage.
Analogously to the reduction R we denote by msgj the step of the honest user U which
on input a public key pk, a message m and the previous message msgi of the signer,
outputs message msgj sent to the signer. Likewise, in mode finish the user creates the
signature from its state and the final message sent by the signer.
Description of the Meta-Reduction. The meta-reductionM works as follows (see
Figure 3.2 for the case of three moves). It gets as input an instance y of the problem.
It start to simulate the reduction R on y to derive a public key pk as well as the first
message msg1 on behalf of the signer and a state stmsg1. AlgorithmM first completes
an instance of the signature issuing protocol with R using the program of the honest
user on input a random message m0 from {0, 1}n and some randomness r. Afterwards,
it selects another message m′ from {0, 1}n at random together with some independent
randomness r′ and resets the reduction to the point where R has returned the first
message of the signature issuing protocol. As before, M executes the honest user
algorithm on m′ using the randomness r′.
Now, if the meta-reduction obtains two valid signatures σ0, σ1 from both executions,
then it hands the pairs (m0, σ0), (m1, σ1) to the reduction which then outputs some x′.
The meta-reduction returns x′ and stops. For brevity we often write RM(y) for this
interaction.
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Analysis of the Meta-Reduction. The final step is to show that the reduction R
successfully outputs a solution x′, even if given the pairs fromM instead of receiving
them from the magic adversary. For this it suffices to show that
Prob
[
y ← I(1n), x′ ← RM(y) : V (x′, y) = 1 ∣∣M]
is non-negligible. As outlined above, for this we exploit the transcript-independence of
signatures.
Assume to the contrary that the reduction R outputs a valid solution x′ with non-
negligible probability if R receives two message-signature pairs (m0, σ0), (m1, σ1) from
the magic adversary,
Prob
[
y ← I(1n), x′ ← RA(y) : V (x′, y) = 1 ∣∣A magic] 6≈ 0,
but succeeds only with negligible probability if the message-signature pairs are gener-
ated byM:
Prob
[
y ← I(1n), x′ ← RM(y) : V (x′, y) = 1 ∣∣M] ≈ 0.
Then we construct an adversary S∗trans who breaks the transcript independence of sig-
natures in experiment trans-indBSS∗,Σ(n).
Description of Adversary S∗trans. Informally, the adversary relays the first execution
between the reduction and the external user instance and resets to reduction afterwards
to answer the second execution. Afterwards S∗trans receives two message-signature pairs
without knowing whether the second signature σ0 has been derived from the signature
issuing protocol or with the help of Σ. We then use the result of the reduction to
distinguish this case.
More formally, the adversary S∗trans generates an instance y ← I(n) of a cryptographic
problem P . It simulates R in a black-box way, which for input y initially outputs a
public key pk as well as the first message msg1 and some state information stmsg1. The
algorithm S∗trans selects two random message m−1,m0 ∈ {0, 1}n and outputs pk,m−1,m0
according to the transcript-independence experiment. It stores the first message (from
R to U) and relays the communication between the reduction R and the first external
user instance U(pk,m−1). Then the adversary resets R to the point where R has
returned msg1 and forwards the communication between R and U .
After having finished both executions S∗trans receives two (valid) signatures (σ−1, σ0)
and runs the reduction R in mode final on input (st0msg3,m−1, σ−1,m0, σ0) to obtain a
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putative solution x′ of the cryptographic problem P . The final output of the adversary
is b∗ ← V (x′, y).
Analysis of S∗trans. For the analysis recall that the magic adversary, after a single
interaction, outputs two message-signature pairs (with the help of Σ). In fact, taking
the message-signature pairs (m−1, σ−1) of the first execution together with the message-
signature pair (m0, σ0) derived from Σ in experiment trans-indBSS∗,Σ(n) corresponds ex-
actly to the behavior of the magic adversary (b = 0). Here we take advantage of the
fact that the second execution with the user cannot fail (and force the signatures to be
undefined) by our assumption about the vanilla reduction always making the honest
user derive a signature.
On the other hand, during the issuing protocol with the honest user U , the adver-
sary S∗trans resets R and uses in the second execution the prefix msg1 (obtained dur-
ing the signature generation of (m−1, σ−1)) in experiment trans-indBSS∗,Σ(n). Therefore
the message-signature pairs (m−1, σ−1), (mb, σb) are computed in the same way as the
meta-reduction M does (b = 1). Note that the additional run of Σ in the transcript-
independence experiment cannot make the three signatures invalid (except with neg-
ligible probability), because of the statistical blindness and the signature derivation
checks. More specifically, the statistical blindness guarantees that the transcript gener-
ated with U for message m−1 is (almost surely) also a potential transcript for m0 = m1
used by Σ. Furthermore, the signature derivation check tells us that, independently of
the message, the transcript allows the user to derive a signature (such that Σ, too, will
find a valid random string r for the simulated user with a valid signature). This fact
is stated more formally in Corollary 3.3.5. For simplicity we neglect the small error for
Σ returning an invalid signature in the analysis below. We obtain for the probability
that S∗trans outputs the right bit b∗ = b:
Prob[ b∗ = b] = 1
2
+ 1
2
· (Prob[ b∗ = 1 | b = 1]− Prob[ b∗ = 1 | b = 0])
According to our construction, b = 0 corresponds to the case where the simulation
mimics the behavior of the magic adversary, and b = 1 the setting involving the meta-
reduction. Furthermore, the adversary S∗trans returns b∗ = 1 in the case that the reduc-
tion R returns a valid solution x′ of y. Hence,
Prob[ b∗ = 1 | b = 1]− Prob[ b∗ = 1 | b = 0]
= Prob
[
y ← I(1n), x′ ← RA(y) : V (x′, y) = 1 ∣∣A magic]
− Prob[y ← I(1n), x′ ← RM(y) : V (x′, y) = 1 ∣∣M] .
By assumption the difference is non-negligible (because the first probability is non-
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negligible and we have assumed that the second probability is negligible). This, however,
contradicts the transcript independence of signatures.
3.4 Impossibility Result for Statistically Blind
Signature Schemes
Here we discuss more general reductions which may reset the adversary and run several
nested executions with multiple copies of the adversary.
For simplicity, we model a single, resettable instance of the adversary as a sequence of
identical copies of the adversary which cannot be reset. Whenever the reduction seeks
to reset the adversary, we instead invoke the next copy and run it up to the reset point
with the same messages as before.
More precisely, we assume that the reduction R is an interactive Turing machine which
communicates with a “scheduled pool” of q2 Turing machines Ai,j for i, j = 1, 2, . . . , q
for some polynomial q = q(n) (which is bounded by the running time of the reduction).
In this q × q matrix each Turing machine Ai,1, . . . ,Ai,q in row i is initialized with the
same random string, which is chosen independently for each row.
We assume that the reduction has full control over the flow of interactions but can only
deliver the i-th message in an execution after the (i − 1)-st message in this execution
has been sent (where we assume that the first transmission also comprises the public
key). Instead of resetting the adversary Ai,j the reduction then invokes the next column
Ai,j+1 in this row and sends the same messages as before up to the reset point (but the
reduction can never go back to a previous column). We also assume for simplicity that
the reduction finishes each execution in a row before proceeding to the next column (say,
by sending ⊥ as the third message). The q rows therefore correspond to q independent,
resettable instances of the adversary, and in each row there is at any time only one
“active” column execution.
3.4.1 Preliminaries
To build our meta-reduction we will reset the reduction continuously. That is, whenever
the reduction expects a forgery from an instance of the magic adversary, we freeze
the scenario and branch into a loop in which the meta-reduction seeks a second valid
message-signature pair. In order to avoid an exponential blow-up in the running time
of such rewinding executions [DNS04], we consider slightly restricted reductions.
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pk,msg1−−−−−−−→ pk,msg1−−−−−−−→ pk,msg1−−−−−−−→
row 1
msg2←−−−−−−− msg2←−−−−−−− msg2←−−−−−−−
msg3−−−−−−−→ invalid msg3
′
−−−−−−−→ valid msg3
′′
−−−−−−−→ valid
pk∗,msg1∗−−−−−−−→
row 2
msg2∗←−−−−−−−
msg3∗−−−−−−−→ invalid
Figure 3.3: Example of a resetting scheduling with restricted cross-resets (executions in
different rows may also run concurrently): Regarding the first and last execution in row 1
there is no other successful execution in between transmission of msg2 and msg3′′, except
when it uses the same (pk,msg1) in the same row (as the third execution). The scheduling
would violate the restricted resetting scenario if, for example, the execution in row 2 was valid
(even if it was for the same (pk∗,msg1∗) = (pk,msg1)), or if the third execution in row 1 was
valid but for a different (pk′,msg1′).
Resetting Reductions with Restricted Cross-Resets. Any reduction in our case
is allowed to run concurrent executions with the copies of the adversary, each copy
resetting at most q times, except that the reduction has to finish the interaction in the
order according to the arrival of the second messages of the signature issue protocol.
That is, suppose that the reduction receives the second message msg2 (the user message)
in some execution in row i which started with (pk,msg1). Suppose further that the
reduction later finishes some execution with the same first transmission (pk,msg1) in
the same row i by sending a third message allowing the user to derive a signature. Then,
the reduction does not finish any other execution (in a different row or for distinct
(pk′,msg1′)) in between these two points such that the user is also able to generate
a valid signature for this execution (see Figure 3.3 for an example). By this, we can
later rewind from the valid signature generation to the step where msg2 has been sent,
without destroying other executions which have been finished successfully meanwhile.
Any reduction in our case is allowed to run q = q(n) concurrent executions with the
copies of the adversary, each copy resetting at most q times, except that the reduction
has to finish the interaction in the order according to the arrival of the second messages
of the signature issue protocol. That is, consider a three-move signature issuing run of
the reduction with a copy of the adversary playing the honest user. Assume that the
reduction receives the second message in this execution (which has been sent by the
adversary resp. user), and call this execution pending from then on. We say that the
reduction successfully finishes this pending execution if it sends the third message of
the protocol such that the user is able to derive a valid signature.
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The cross-reset restriction now demands that, if the reduction ever finishes a pending
execution successfully, then there is no other execution which has become pending and
has been finished successfully meanwhile. In other words, between the pending state
of an execution and its completion the reduction may not receive the second message
and complete any other execution (for which the user can compute a signature). We
remark that the reduction may decide to entirely abort a pending execution and is still
allowed to finish other pending executions, as long as the user is unable to produce a
signature from that interaction.
Definition 3.4.1 (Resetting Reduction with Restricted Cross-Resets).
Consider a run of the reduction and its matrix of q2(n) executions. For an execution
(i, j) let τmsg2(i, j) = (t, pk,msg1) be the point in time t where the user message is
delivered, and where (pk,msg1) has been sent as the first transmission in this execu-
tion. Let τvalid(i, j) = (t′, pk′,msg1′) be the point in time t′, where the user receives
the third message and is able to derive a valid signature from this interaction with
first transmission (pk′,msg1′). Then we say that the run of the reduction is resetting
(with restricted cross-resets) if for any (i, j, k) such that τmsg2(i, j) = (t, pk,msg1) and
τvalid(i, k) = (t
′, pk,msg1) for t < t′ the following holds: If there is (i∗, j∗) such that
τvalid(i
∗, j∗) = (t∗, pk∗,msg1∗) for t < t∗ < t′ then i∗ = i and (pk∗,msg1∗) = (pk,msg1).
A reduction is called resetting with restricted cross-resets if it is resetting (with restricted
cross-resets) for every run.
Note that the scheduling of reductions with restricted cross-resets is related to so-called
bounded concurrent (and resettable) executions [Bar01]. In m-bounded concurrent
executions the number of instances running simultaneously is bounded by some fixed
function m = m(n) where the bound itself is known by the protocol. We do not put any
a-priori bound on the number of concurrently running executions, because the number
q of such instances depends on the reduction and is not bounded by a fixed polynomial.
We merely restrict the way successful executions are finished. We also note that we can
extend our proof below to allow a constant number of successfully finished executions
between pending runs, but state and prove the simpler version for sake of readability.
q-wise Independent Hash Functions. An adequate measure to thwart reset attacks
are usually pseudorandom functions (e.g., as in [CGGM00]). The idea is to make the
randomness of the adversary depend on the communication by computing it as the
output of the pseudorandom function for the communication. In this case, resetting
the adversary essentially yields runs with independent random choices.
Here, we use the same idea but can fall back to the weaker requirement of q-wise inde-
pendent hash functions in order to avoid the additional assumption that pseudorandom
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functions exist. Roughly speaking, q-wise independent hash function are functions that,
when queried for q distinct preimages, output q independently distributed values:
Definition 3.4.2 (q-wise Independent Hash Function). A family H of efficiently
computable functions h : {0, 1}a 7→ {0, 1}b is q-wise independent if for any distinct
elements x1, x2, . . . , xq ∈ {0, 1}a and any y1, . . . , yq ∈ {0, 1}b we have
Prob[h(x1) = y1, . . . , h(xq) = yq] = (2
−b)q ,
where the probability is taken over the random choice of h. We also assume that the
sampling h← H(1n) is efficiently computable.
A typical example for q-wise independent hash function is a polynomial of degree q− 1
over GF (2a) for a = b.
We note that using q-wise independent hash functions instead of pseudorandom func-
tions makes the adversary now depend on the reduction. Namely, below we use q as the
number of maximal resets per row. However, since we deal with black-box reductions
this is admissible. We also remark that we can overcome this dependency by using
pseudorandom functions instead of q-wise independent hash function.
The New Magic Adversary. We use again the generic forgery oracle from the vanilla
case. But here we augment our “new” magic adversary through a q-wise independent
hash function (i.e., the random hash function h is given by parts of the adversary’s
randomness). Informally, the adversary again runs the issuing protocol with the signer
in the role of the honest user once. However, it now generates the message (and the
user’s randomness) as the result of the q-wise independent hash function applied to
the public key and the first message of the signer. Again, in the case that the single
execution yields a valid signature, then the magic adversary here also creates another
valid signature.
As we will later view Σ to be an integral part of the magic adversary and thus let
the adversary provide the randomness s ∈ {0, 1}ψ(n) required by oracle Σ. We denote
this augmented (deterministic) oracle with Σaug which now takes pk, trans,m and ran-
domness s as input and returns σ. This randomness is also derived through the q-wise
independent hash function, ensuring consistent answers for the same data (pk,msg1).
We note that the length ψ(n) of this randomness is only polynomial by construction of
the generic forgery oracle:
Definition 3.4.3 (Magic Adversary). The magic adversary A = Aq (with param-
eter q) for input pk and access to the generic forgery oracle Σaug and communicating
with an oracle 〈S(sk), ·〉1 works as described in the following steps:
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select a hash function h from the family of q-wise independent hash functions H
run an execution 〈S(sk),U(pk,m′0; r′0)〉 in the role of an honest user, where
(m′0,m
′
1, r
′
0, s
′
0)← h(pk,msg1) is generated as the result of the
q-wise independent hash function applied to the public key pk and
the first message msg1 of S; let σ′0 denote the resulting signature and
trans′0 the corresponding transcript.
if Vf(pk,m′0, σ′0) = 1 then let σ′1 ← Σaug(pk, trans′0,m′1; s′0) else set σ′0, σ′1 ← ⊥
return (m′0, σ′0,m′1, σ′1)
It follows again from the completeness of BS together with the construction of the
generic forgery oracle that the magic adversary succeeds in the unforgeability experi-
ment with probability negligibly close to 1.
3.4.2 Impossibility Result
In the following we extend our result to restricted-cross resets.
Theorem 3.4.4. Let BS be a three-move blind signature scheme, which is statistically
blind and has statistical signature-derivation checks. Then there is no resetting (with
restricted cross-resets) black-box reduction from unforgeability of the blind signature
scheme BS to a hard non-interactive problem.
Proof. The idea of the proof follows the one of Theorem 3.3.7 but differs in the point
that the reductionR is allowed to reset the adversary A. In order to handle these resets,
we provide the adversary with a q-wise independent hash function (i.e., we consider the
adversary A = Aq). This makes each resetting execution independent and allows the
meta-reductionM to simulate the reduction. We can now also switch from Σaug to Σ
as long as we guarantee that Σ gives identical answers for executions with the same
pk,msg1; this can be easily implemented by table look-ups.
In the main step of the proof, we then construct a meta-reductionM which mimics the
adversarial behavior (without the help of Σ) by rewinding the reduction R. This time,
instead of rewinding the reduction only once in the only execution, our meta-reduction
branches into a special loop phase to derive the second message-signature pair. Once
entering this phase M rewinds till it finds another accepting execution. Note that
this is possible in polynomial time by our assumption about the restricted resetting
scheduling, because no other execution is successfully finished meanwhile. When M
has found another valid pair it returns to the main simulation of the reduction.
We again show thatM’s behavior and the one of the magic adversary are indistinguish-
able to R by the transcript independence of signatures. But this time, unlike in the
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rewind←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
pk,msg1−−−−−−−→ pk,msg1−−−−−−−→
row 1 . . .
msg2←−−−−−−− msg2←−−−−−−−
msg3−−−−−−−→ invalid msg3
′
−−−−−−−→ valid
pk∗,msg1∗−−−−−−−→
row 2
msg2∗←−−−−−−−
msg3∗−−−−−−−→ invalid
Figure 3.4: Continuously rewind to first execution in the row in which the same (pki,j ,msg1i,j)
has been sent. By the restricted resetting scheduling no other execution can finish successfully
meanwhile.
case of vanilla reductions where we only had a single rewinding, the meta-reductions
here loops multiple times to find the second message-signature pair. In order to show
that transcript independence guarantees indistinguishability in this case, we need to
be able to check if we have inserted the external data from the tanscript-independence
experiment in the right loop. This can be ensured by the signature derivation checks.
Description of the Meta-Reduction. The input of the meta-reduction M is an
instance y of a cryptographic problem P . It runs black-box simulation of the reduction
R on input y and initializes an empty list L. This list stores elements of the form
(i, j, pki,j,msg1i,j,m′i,j, σ′i,j) which correspond to the (i, j)-th execution; where the tuple
(pki,j,msg1i,j) has been used during the first transmission; and the message-signature
pair (m′i,j, σ′i,j) has been derived by rewinding.
Now, the reduction R expects to communicate in a black-box way with an adversary
A. The meta-reduction M mimics the magic adversary A but computes the second
message-signature pair differently. That is, consider the (i, j)-th execution, where the
meta-reductionM receives the third message msg3i,j that allows it to compute a sig-
nature σi,j for a message mi,j. The adversary, and thus the meta-reductionM, is now
supposed to output another valid message-signature pair. To do so, M first checks
wether is has already stored such a pair for the transmission (pki,j,msg1i,j) is the list
L, i.e., if (i, h, pki,j,msg1i,j,m′i,h, σ′i,h) ∈ L for some h < j. In this case, M returns
the tuple (mi,j, σi,j) (which is the pair obtained through a “normal” execution) together
with the pair (m′i,h, σ′i,h) (which is the pair derived by rewinding the reduction) to R
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and continues the simulation. (This is consistent with the adversary’s reply as in such
rows the magic adversary too obtains identical answer from Σaug.)
Assume thatM does not find such an entry in L. The meta-reductionM then searches
through all communications in this row to find the first matching round t ≤ j where
the adversaryM received (pki,j,msg1i,j), i.e., it searches for the tuple (t, pki,j,msg1i,j).
It then freezes the simulation of R and branches into a subroutine that executes a copy
of R for the same state before receiving the second message msg2 of the protocol in
this execution, i.e., it rewinds the copy of R to time t.
In the following we omit the index of the row since it is fixed and because it simplifies
the notation. For the subprogram the meta-reduction repeats the following steps until
M is able to derive another message-signature pair. The meta-reductionM keeps on
rewinding the reduction (and thus the signature issuing protocol) to the point where
the user algorithm U computes the second message msg2h for the h-th execution. For
the `-th rewinding, it selects an independent random message m`h from {0, 1}n together
with some randomness r`h and continues the signature issuing protocol in the role of an
honest user algorithm with R. Observe thatM has rewound R to the point where the
user algorithm received (pkj,msg1j), thus the first message and the public key remain
unchanged. Since the reduction may have continued with other executions (a, b), we
use the same values ma,b, ra,b as before in order to guarantee a consistent simulation.
The meta-reduction starts with next loop if it does not find another valid pair in this
execution, i.e., if this execution does not yield a valid pair for the same first transmission
(pkj,msg1j).
After M has successfully derived a second message-signature pair (m′h, σ′h) in row i,
it jumps back into the main execution (to the point where R has sent the third mes-
sage msg3 and the honest user algorithm has derived a valid message signature pair
(mi,j, σi,j)), and returns both message-signture pairs (mi,j, σi,j),(m′i,j, σ′i,j) to R. It
stores the tuple (i, h, pki,h,msg1i,j,m′i,h, σ′i,h) in L and continues the simulation. When
the reduction outputs a putative solution x′ to y, then the meta-reduction also stops
with output x′.
Running Time of the Meta-Reduction M. We first show that the meta-reduction
M has an expected polynomial running time Time(M), despite the possibly infinitely
many loops. This follows by a standard argument.
Let i,j denote the conditional probability that we successfully find a valid signature
in execution (i, j) and that this is the first successful execution in this row for the
transmission pki,j,msg1i,j (in any other case the meta-reduction finds a valid entry
in the list L and does not enter the loop phase at all). Here, we condition on the
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randomness of the reduction and all other fixed message-signature values (such that
the probability is only over the choice of mi,j, ri,j).
Then, it takes another expected 1/i,j repetitions to find the second pair, such that for
any i, j the expected number of loops (including the main execution and given arbitrary
other fixed values) is 1 + i,j/i,j = 2. Note that this analysis is under the assumption
that we have a restricted resetting scheduling and never run into nested branches. Since
each loop thus takes polynomial time on the average only and the simulation of the
reduction is polynomially bounded, the claim follows.
Pruning the Meta-Reduction. Recall that our goal is to show that the probability
that the reduction R still succeeds when communicating withM instead of A. For an
algorithm Z let Succ(Z) be the event that V (x′, y) = 1 for y ← I(1n), x′ ← RZ(y).
Then our goal is to show that
Prob[Succ(M)] := Prob[y ← I(1n), x′ ← RM(y) : V (x′, y) = 1] 6≈ 0
is non-negligible (given Prob[Succ(A)] 6≈ 0). We now prune the meta-reduction in
the simulation above in the sense that in each loop phase our meta-reduction Mr(n)
stops after at most r(n) repetitions (and aborts if it has not found a second pair). The
polynomial parameter r(n) will be chosen later.
We first analyze the success probability ofMr(n). Clearly,
Prob[Succ(M)] ≥ Prob[Succ(Mr(n))]
and it therefore suffices to show that the reduction’s success probability when interacting
with the pruned meta-reductionMr(n) is non-negligible. Let Boundr(n) denote the event
that in each execution M rewinds R at most r(n) times. We then divide the success
probability Prob[Succ(M)] into the case whereM rewinds the reduction R more then
r(n) times in some loop, and into the other case whereM rewinds the reduction R at
most r(n) times for all loops:
Prob[Succ(M)] ≤ Prob[Succ(M) ∧ Boundr(n)]+ Prob[¬Boundr(n)]
≤ Prob[Succ(Mr(n)) ∧ Boundr(n)]+ Prob[¬Boundr(n)]
≤ Prob[Succ(Mr(n)) ∣∣Boundr(n) ]+ Prob[¬Boundr(n)]
We now define r(n). According to the assumption that the reduction R with access to
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the magic adversary A succeeds with non-negligible probability, let
Prob[Succ(A)] ≥ 1
p(n)
for some polynomial p(n) and infinitely many n’s. Let E [Time(M)] = t(n) be the
(expected) polynomial running time ofM. Now set
r(n) := 2 · p(n) · t(n).
Using Markov’s inequality we can calculate the probability that the event ¬Boundr(n)
happens as
Prob
[¬Boundr(n)] ≤ Prob[Time(M) ≥ r(n)] ≤ E [Time(M)]
r(n)
≤ 1
2p(n)
.
Particularly, the probability thatM rewinds the reduction R more then r(n) times in
some execution, is at most 1
2p(n)
.
Comparing the different success probabilities of R with access to the magic adversary
A and toM, we have for infinitely many n’s:
Prob[Succ(A)]− Prob[Succ(M)]
≥ Prob[Succ(A)]− Prob[Succ(Mr(n)) ∣∣Boundr(n) ]− Prob[¬Boundr(n)]
≥ 1
2
· Prob[Succ(A)]− Prob[Succ(Mr(n)) ∣∣Boundr(n) ]
≥ 1
2
· (Prob[Succ(A)]− Prob[Succ(Mr(n)) ∣∣Boundr(n) ]) .
In the sequel we assume towards contradiction that Prob
[
Succ(Mr(n))
∣∣Boundr(n) ] is
negligible. We again use transcript-independence of signatures to derive a contradiction.
Description of Adversary S∗trans. In order to derive a contradiction we build a suc-
cessful attacker S∗trans against the transcript-independence of signatures. This adversary
works similar to the previously described adversary S∗trans in the proof of Theorem 3.3.7.
The difference consists in combining the experiment trans-indBSS∗,Σ(n) (where only two
executions take place) and the meta-reduction (where many interactions take place).
To overcome the difference the adversary picks a random subroutine call k among all
at most q2 ones and tries to insert the data provided by its experiment trans-indBSS∗,Σ(n)
in one of the at most r(n) repetitions, whichMr(n) makes to find the second message-
signature pair.
More formally, in a first step the adversary S∗trans computes an instance y ← I(1n) of
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a cryptographic problem P and selects a random index k ∈ {1, . . . , q2}. It proceeds
with the black-box simulation of the reduction R which takes the instance y as input.
During the simulation of R adversary S∗trans maintains a copy ofMr(n) and mainly uses
this algorithm to compute the answers.
Only in the first k subroutine calls of Mr(n) (in which the meta-reduction loops to
compute the second pair) algorithm S∗trans diverges from Mr(n)’s strategy as follows.
For the first k − 1 of the runs in which Mr(n) branches into the extraction procedure
for execution (i, j), adversary S∗trans uses its oracle Σ to compute a signature σ∗i,j for an
independent random message m∗i,j. It stores (i, j, pki,j,msg1i,j,m∗i,j, σ∗i,j) in L and uses
this message-signature pair instead and ignores the meta-reduction’s pair (if it finds
one). Another exception is the way the answers for the k-th subprogram execution are
derived. Here the adversary S∗trans behaves as follows. Let (pki,j,msg1i,j) be the data
initially sent by the reduction in this execution. Adversary S∗trans executes experiment
trans-indBSS∗,Σ(n) using R, i.e., S∗trans uses the public key sent by R as his public key
during the experiment trans-indBSS∗,Σ(n). It selects two random messages m′−1,m′0 as the
challenges and outputs (pk,m′−1,m′0). The adversary S∗trans relays the first instances
of the signature issuing protocol between R and U and checks whether U is able to
derive a signature. If the signature-derivation check returns c = 0, i.e., indicating that
the user should not be able to generate a valid signature, then S∗trans stops, outputting
a random bit b∗. Otherwise, S∗trans proceeds with the simulation as follows. For the
other signature generation for m′0, adversary S∗trans guesses how many rewindings (of
R) are necessary in order to derive another pair. For this, it selects a random index
t ∈ {1, . . . , r(n)} and computes t − 1 random messages m` as well as t − 1 random
strings r` for ` = 1, 2, . . . , t − 1. During the `-th repetition for ` < t, adversary S∗trans
executes an instance of the user algorithm U using the coins r` as well as the message
m`. If one of these t − 1 instances already yields a valid signature, then S∗trans aborts
and outputs a random bit b∗ as its final output.
Otherwise, at the beginning of the t-th rewinding (in which S∗trans expects to generate
a signature successfully), the adversary forwards msg1i,j to the external user instance
(holding key pki,j and message m′b) in experiment trans-ind
BS
S∗,Σ(n) to receive an answer
msg2. The meta-reduction uses this answer in all executions in this row i with first
transmission pki,j,msg1i,j. Additionally, in all these executions (except for (i, j)) the
adversary runs the signature-derivation checks to see if an earlier execution would yield
a valid signature. If any of these checks returns c = 1, i.e., that the user should be able
to generate a valid signature, the S∗trans immediately stops with a random output bit b∗.
In any other case, the adversary returns ⊥ to the reduction as the reply to msg3.
For execution (i, j) the adversary takes the reduction’s answer msg3 and forwards it
to the external user instance. If the interaction with the external user instance does
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not yield a valid signature (or, more generally, if both σ′−1, σ′0 are invalid), then S∗trans
stops outputting a random bit b∗. Otherwise, it returns to R the message-signature
pairs (mi,j, σi,j,m′1, σ′1), where mi,j, σi,j have been generated during the first execution
and m′0, σ′0 has been derived either with the help of Σ or through the interaction with
U in experiment trans-indBSS∗,Σ(n). We remark that, for each valid execution, S∗trans also
enters the rewind phases and seeks a second message-signature pair in r(n) loops. If the
meta-reduction fails to find such a pair in any of these rewinding steps then we let S∗trans
immediately abort, outputting a random bit b∗. If no premature abort happens then,
eventually, the reduction outputs a putative solution x′ for a cryptographic problem P .
The final output of S∗trans (if it has not aborted before) is V (x′, y)⊕ 1.
Analysis of Adversary S∗trans. To analyze the success probability of S∗trans we define
the following hybrid oracles. Consider a run of the reduction with q2 oracles, but where
we use the strategy of the meta-reductionMr(n) in the all executions, except that we
use the magic adversary in the first k subprocedure executions to replace the second
pair (or to find a pair at all ifMr(n) has not found one). We denote this “oracle matrix”
by Hk. Accordingly, we write Succ(Hk) for the event that the reduction R successfully
outputs a solution x′ to y ← I(1n) when interacting with such a hybrid oracle set.
By construction we have identical behavior for the extreme hybrids to the adversary’s
attack and the execution of the meta-reduction, respectively, where we use in the former
case the fact that A computes the pairs (m, r) with the help of the q-wise independent
hash function (just asMr(n) picks fresh random values):
Prob[Succ(Hq2)] = Prob[Succ(A)] and Prob[Succ(H0)] = Prob
[
Succ(Mr(n))
]
.
We will now set this in relationship to the success probability of S∗trans predicting b with
its output b∗.
First, we collect the cases that S∗trans aborts prematurely, returning a random bit b∗. This
happens if event ¬Boundr(n) occurs, if the adversary’s guess t for the right repetition has
been wrong (event ¬Guess), or if the guess has been right but the signature-derivation
check returns a wrong answer, saying that the user was able to compute a signature
while he was not (event ¬SDCh+). Similarly, the simulation may be erroneous if the
check returns that the user is not able to derive a signature but he actually is (event
¬SDCh−).
It is easy to see that the probability for event ¬SDCh+ ∨ ¬SDCh− is negligible by the
signature-derivation check; else one can easily build a successful attacker from S∗trans
against this property. Hence, this simulation error can only affect the adversary’s
success probability for predicting b negligibly. From now on we therefore implicitly
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condition on the event SDCh+ ∧ SDCh− that all signature-derivation checks return the
right answer.
For the probability of predicting b we now take into account the cases that events
Boundr(n) and Guess do not hold (in which case S∗trans returns a random bit b∗ and
succeeds with probability 1
2
), and derive:
Prob[ b = b∗]
= Prob
[
b = b∗
∣∣¬Boundr(n) ∨ ¬Guess] · Prob[¬Boundr(n) ∨ ¬Guess]
+ Prob
[
b = b∗
∣∣Boundr(n),Guess] · Prob[Boundr(n) ∧ Guess]
= 1
2
· (1− Prob[Boundr(n) ∧ Guess])
+ Prob
[
Boundr(n) ∧ Guess
] · Prob[ b = b∗ ∣∣Boundr(n),Guess]
= 1
2
+ Prob
[
Boundr(n) ∧ Guess
] · (Prob[ b = b∗ ∣∣Boundr(n),Guess]− 12)
Next, note that Prob
[
Guess
∣∣Boundr(n) ] = 1/r(n), because given that we always find
another message-signature pair in r(n) loops we pick the right one to insert the data
with this probability. Since we also have Prob
[
Boundr(n)
] ≥ 1 − 1/2p(n) we conclude
that Prob
[
Boundr(n) ∧ Guess
]
is non-negligible. But then it suffices to show that the
probability of predicting b under these two conditions is bounded away from 1
2
by a
non-negligible amount. This follows by refining the view with respect to bit b:
Prob
[
b = b∗
∣∣Boundr(n),Guess]− 12
= Prob[ b = 1] · Prob[ b = b∗ ∣∣Boundr(n),Guess, b = 1]
+ Prob[ b = 0] · Prob[ b = b∗ ∣∣Boundr(n),Guess, b = 0]− 12
= 1
2
· (1− Prob[ b∗ = 0 ∣∣Boundr(n),Guess, b = 1])
+ 1
2
· Prob[ b∗ = 0 ∣∣Boundr(n),Guess, b = 0]− 12
= 1
2
· (Prob[ b∗ = 0 ∣∣Boundr(n),Guess, b = 1]
− Prob[ b∗ = 0 ∣∣Boundr(n),Guess, b = 0])
Taking the random choice k of S∗trans into account we obtain:
Prob
[
b∗ = 0
∣∣Guess,Boundr(n), b = 1]− Prob[ b∗ = 0 ∣∣Guess,Boundr(n), b = 0]
=
q2∑
k0=1
(
Prob
[
b∗ = 0 ∧ k = k0
∣∣Guess,Boundr(n), b = 1]
−Prob[ b∗ = 0 ∧ k = k0 ∣∣Guess,Boundr(n), b = 0])
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= 1
q2
·
q2∑
k0=1
(
Prob
[
b∗ = 0
∣∣Guess,Boundr(n), b = 1, k = k0 ]
−Prob[ b∗ = 0 ∣∣Guess,Boundr(n), b = 0, k = k0 ])
The probability that S∗trans outputs b∗ = 0, given that the guess is right, the number
of repetitions is bounded and b = 1 (i.e., S∗trans forwards the signature generated by Σ)
and that k = k0, equals the probability for Succ(Hk0) (under the condition Boundr(n)).
Similarly, under these conditions and that b = 0, i.e., that S∗trans inserts the commu-
nication with the user from experiment trans-indBSS∗,Σ(n), the probability for b∗ = 0 is
identical to the one for Succ(Hk0−1) (under the condition Boundr(n)). The latter also
relies on Corollary 3.3.5 (page 22) that Σ succeeds in producing a signature with over-
whelming probability if the first execution is valid, because it is guaranteed that S∗trans
obtains the two signatures from the user instances in the experiment (if Σ would fail
then the transcript-independence experiment would return ⊥ for all three executions).
We ignore this negligible error in Corollary 3.3.5 for simplicity and conclude that
Prob
[
b∗ = 0
∣∣Boundr(n),Guess, b = 1]− Prob[ b∗ = 0 ∣∣Boundr(n),Guess, b = 0]
= 1
q2
·
q2∑
k0=1
(
Prob
[
Succ(Hk0)
∣∣Boundr(n) ]− Prob[Succ(Hk0−1) ∣∣Boundr(n) ])
= 1
q2
· (Prob[Succ(Hq2) ∣∣Boundr(n) ]− Prob[Succ(H0) ∣∣Boundr(n) ])
= 1
q2
· (Prob[Succ(Hq2)]− Prob[Succ(Mr(n)) ∣∣Boundr(n) ])
= 1
q2
· (Prob[Succ(A)]− Prob[Succ(Mr(n)) ∣∣Boundr(n) ]) .
where we used the fact that the success probability for the case Hq2 is independent
of event Boundr(n) (because in this experiment all second message-signature pairs are
provided by oracle Σ, independently of whether the pruned meta-reduction finds a
second pair). Plugging this latter term into the previous equation for Prob[ b = b∗], we
obtain
Prob[ b = b∗]
≥ 1
2
+ 1
2r(n)q2(n)
·
(
1− 1
2p(n)
)
· (Prob[Succ(A)]− Prob[Succ(Mr(n)) ∣∣Boundr(n) ]) .
By assumption, the probability for a success of R with the magic adversary is non-
negligible, whereas for the pruned meta-reduction (under condition Boundr(n)) it drops
to negligible. But then we have derived a successful attacker against the transcript inde-
pendence of signatures. It follows that our assumption Prob
[
Succ(Mr(n))
∣∣Boundr(n) ]
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being negligible must have been wrong. Since
Prob
[
Succ(Mr(n))
] ≥ Prob[Boundr(n)] · Prob[Succ(Mr(n)) ∣∣Boundr(n) ]
≥
(
1− 1
2p(n)
)
· Prob[Succ(Mr(n)) ∣∣Boundr(n) ]
it follows that the success probability ofMr(n) must be non-negligible, too. Also note
thatMr(n) gives us a solver running in fixed polynomial time.
Let us re-capture the step where we used the fact that our scheme has three moves only.
For this we look at the construction of S∗trans, showing that any significant difference in
the reduction’s success probability when communicating with A or withMr(n) can be
used to break transcript-independence of signatures. This adversary uses the external
procedures Σ and U to derive the second pair (in one of the r(n) repetitions). In
particular, the external user algorithm cannot be reset according to the transcript-
independence experiment.
Fortunately, since the blind signature scheme has only three moves we can simply insert
the same second message of the external user in all executions with the same pk,msg1.
In other words, resets are easy to simulate. If the blind signature scheme had four
or more moves, however, the reduction could reset each execution at different points,
possibly extracting some knowledge about the message and/or the randomness of the
user. Adversary S∗trans could in general not simulate these steps without resetting the
external user algorithm.
3.5 Impossibility Result for Computationally Blind
Signature Schemes
Here we extend our result to computationally blind signature schemes.
3.5.1 Preliminaries
We augment the definition of blindness by allowing the malicious signer S∗ to invoke an
oracle Σ. As before, we note that Σ will break unforgeability and the definition below
says that blindness should still hold, even if one can forge signatures. As an example,
consider Chaum’s scheme, where perfect blindness is preserved even if one can break
RSA.
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Definition 3.5.1 (Blind Signature Scheme Relative to an Oracle Σ). A secure
blind signature scheme BS = (KG, 〈S,U〉 ,Vf) is called computationally blind relative
to an oracle Σ if, for any efficient algorithm S∗ working in modes find, issue and guess
the probability that the following experiment BlindBSS∗ evaluates to 1 is negligibly close to
1/2, where
Experiment BlindBSS∗,Σ(n)
(pk,m0,m1, stfind)← S∗,Σ(find, 1n)
b← {0, 1}
stissue ← S∗〈·,U(pk,mb)〉1,〈·,U(pk,m1−b)〉1,Σ(issue, stfind)
and let σb, σ1−b denote the (possibly undefined) local outputs
of U(pk,mb) resp. U(pk,m1−b).
set (σ0, σ1) = (⊥,⊥) if σ0 = ⊥ or σ1 = ⊥
b∗ ← S∗,Σ(guess, σ0, σ1, stissue)
return 1 iff b = b∗.
Key-Validity Checks. For our impossibility result we need an additional requirement
on the blind signature scheme which allows to check publicly whether a maliciously
chosen public key has a matching secret key (we call this a key-validity check). We
need this property because our result is based on a (different) generic forgery oracle Σ.
In the statistical case the forgery oracle has basically searched for a collision for the
transcript, but in the computational case such collisions may not even exist. Hence,
instead we let Σ now compute a secret key from the public key and then run an execution
between the honest user and the honest signer for this secret key. The key-validity check
tells us whether this strategy succeeds or not.
Definition 3.5.2 (Key-Validity Check). A blind signature scheme BS allows (com-
putational resp. statistical) key-validity checks if there exists an efficient algorithm
KVCh such that for any (efficient resp. unbounded) algorithm S∗ working in modes find
and issue the probability that the following experiment KeyValCheckBSS∗,KVCh evaluates to
1 is negligible, where
Experiment KeyValCheckBSS∗,KVCh
(pk,m, st)← S∗(find, 1n)
c← KVCh(1n, pk)
return 1 if
c = 1 but there does not exist sk′ with (sk′, pk) ∈ [KG(1n)], or
c = 0 but there exists sk′ with (sk′, pk) ∈ [KG(1n)].
If the above holds even if S∗ gets access to an oracle Σ then we say that the scheme has
(computational resp. statistical) key-validity checks relative to Σ.
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The schemes of Pointcheval-Stern and of Boldyreva, for example, allow to implement
such a key-validity check by verifying that the discrete-log groups are admissible (e.g.,
prime order sub group) and that the values are proper group elements.
Generic Forgery Oracle. To define our generic forgery oracle Σc allowing A to break
unforgeability we first outline the idea for the case of Chaum’s blind signature scheme.
Namely, assume that the RSA-exponent e in Chaum’s scheme has a unique matching
secret exponent d. Algorithm Σ(pk,m) then computes the inverse exponent d to the
RSA key (N, e) and sets σ = H(m)d mod N for the hash function description H in the
public key. Note that the message deterministically identifies the signature, and the
distribution of Σ’s output is therefore identical to the one of an honest user.
The above example can be generalized to any blind signature scheme and the following
generic forgery oracle (which only depends on the blind signature scheme in question):
Definition 3.5.3 (Generic Forgery Oracle). For a blind signature scheme BS the
generic forgery oracle Σc = (Σcsk,Σ
c
ex) consists of two algorithms, where
Signing Key Generation. Algorithm Σcsk on input (pk,m) enumerates all possible
random inputs to KG which lead KG for input 1n to produce pk. The oracle uni-
formly picks one of those random strings and returns the corresponding secret key
skΣc which KG outputs for input 1n and for this string. If no such string exists,
then Σcsk returns ⊥.
Execution. Algorithm Σcex takes as input pk,m and a key skΣc and runs an execution
between S(skΣc) and an instance of the honest user U(pk,m). This eventually
yields a signature σ (possibly σ = ⊥) output by the user, and Σcex then returns σ.
We note that any algorithm with oracle access to Σc can call each suboracle individually.
Vice versa, when calling Σc with (pk,m) we assume that Σc internally first executes
Σcsk(pk,m) to derive skΣc and then returns Σ
c
ex’s answer for input pk,m, skΣc . Addi-
tionally, by the completeness of the blind signature scheme the forgery oracle always
returns a valid signature when called for a public key generated by the honest signer.
Transcript Independence. We briefly discuss that transcript-independence in the
computational case (for our generic forgery oracle here) holds because of the blindness
relative to Σc. We remark that, since Σc does not depend on the transcript at all, the
prerequisites do not include signature derivation checks:
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Proposition 3.5.4. Every blind signature scheme, which is blind relative to the generic
forgery oracle Σc, also has computational transcript-independent signatures (with respect
to Σc).
Proof. The proof carries over from the statistical case (Proposition 3.3.4) with slight
changes. So assume that there exists a signer S∗trans in experiment transc-indBSS∗trans,Σ(n)
with the generic forgery oracle Σc which outputs b∗ = b with non-negligible probability
beyond 1/2. Then we construct an adversarial controlled signer S∗blind against the blind-
ness (with oracle access to Σc) as follows. Algorithm S∗blind invokes S∗trans(init, 1n) to get
(pk, st1,m−1,m0) and also runs Σcsk(pk,m0) to get skΣc . It outputs (pk, (st1, skΣc),m0,m0)
as the initial output in the blindness experiment.
In the following S∗blind impersonates the honest user U for input (pk,m−1) in the left
user instance of S∗trans by following the user algorithm. In the right user instance for
the transcript-independence adversary S∗blind relays all the communication with its first
external user instance (for input (pk,m0)). It also invokes the second user instance (also
for (pk,m0)) and uses algorithm S(skΣc) for key skΣc to answer the user.
Algorithm S∗blind eventually obtains (m0, σ0,m0, σ1) (without knowing if σ0 origins from
the communication between S∗trans and the user, or from the internally simulated al-
gorithm S(skΣc) and the user). If σ0 = ⊥ then it also sets σ−1 ← ⊥. In any case
it forwards (m−1, σ−1,m0, σ0) to S∗trans and returns this algorithm’s output b∗ as its
decisional bit.
For the analysis observe that for b = 0 in the blindness experiment the data provided to
S∗trans corresponds exactly to the case b = 0 there. Also, the case b = 1 in the blindness
experiment is exactly like the case b = 1 in the transcript-independence experiment,
because the generic forgery oracle also runs an instance between S(skΣc) and U(pk,m0).
This implies that if S∗trans succeeds with non-negligible probability over 1/2, then S∗blind
also succeeds with non-negligible probability bounded away from 1/2.
Pseudorandom Functions. In order to prove our impossibility result, we take advan-
tage of pseudorandom functions, similar to our deplyoment of q-wise independent hash
functions. To this end we define pseudorandom functions in the presence of an oracle
Σc and magic adversaries with access to Σc. In the following let ρ(n) be the length of
the randomness used by an honest user for an execution of the signing protocol. As
we will later view Σc to be an integral part of the magic adversary and thus let the
adversary provide the randomness s ∈ {0, 1}ψ(n) required by oracle Σc, we also grant
the distinguisher in the pseudorandom experiment here access to the augmented (de-
terministic) oracle Σc,aug which now takes pk,m and randomness s as input and returns
σ:
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Definition 3.5.5 (Pseudorandom Function Relative to Oracle). Let Rn be the
set of all functions f : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}2n+ρ(n)+ψ(n), Σ be an oracle and PRF be an
algorithm which takes as input k ∈ {0, 1}n and x ∈ {0, 1}∗ and returns a value of length
2n+ ρ(n) + ψ(n). Then PRF is called a pseudorandom function relative to oracle Σaug
if for every efficient algorithm D the following holds:
Prob
[
DΣ
aug,PRF(k,·)(1n) = 1
]− Prob[DΣaug,f(·)(1n) = 1] ≈ 0,
where the probability in the first case ist taken over the internal coin tosses of D and
over the choice of k ← {0, 1}n, and in the second case over the internal coin tosses of
D and over the choice of f ← Rn.
An equivalent way of defining pseudorandom functions (relative to oracles) is to give the
distinguisher (in addition to Σaug) either access to q functions PRF(k1, ·), . . . ,PRF(kq, ·)
for independent keys k1, . . . , kq, or to q independent random functions f1, . . . , fq. A
standard hybrid argument shows that for polynomial q = q(n) a function is pseu-
dorandom according to this definition if and only if it is pseudorandom according to
Definition 3.5.5 above (even in presence of Σaug). Below we will make use of this version
with multiple oracles.
The New Magic Adversary. Given the pseudorandom function relative to an oracle
we augment our “magic” adversary through access to a pseudorandom function PRF.
Informally, the adversary again runs the issuing protocol with the signer in the role of the
honest user once. However, it now generates the message (and the user’s randomness)
as the result of the pseudorandom function to the public key and the first message of
the signer. Again, in the case that the single executions yields a valid signature, then
the magic adversary here also creates another valid signature via Σc,aug. Since we view
the oracle Σc as a subroutine of the magic adversary the randomness for Σc is now also
provided explicitly by the adversary and derived through the pseudorandom function
(we note that the length ψ(n) of this randomness is only polynomial by construction of
the generic forgery oracle):
Definition 3.5.6 (Magic Adversary with Access to PRF,Σc). The magic adver-
sary APRF for input pk and access to the generic forgery oracle Σc,aug and communicating
with an oracle 〈S(sk), ·〉1 works as described in the following steps:
select a key k for the pseudorandom function PRF
run an execution 〈S(sk),U(pk,m′0; r′0)〉 in the role of an honest user, where
(m′0,m
′
1, r
′
0, s
′
0)← PRF(k, pk||msg1) is generated as the result of the
pseudorandom function applied to the public key pk and the first
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message msg1 of S; let σ′0 denote the resulting signature.
if Vf(pk,m′0, σ′0) = 1 then let σ′1 ← Σc,aug(pk,m′1; s′0) else set σ′0 ← ⊥, σ′1 ← ⊥
return (m′0, σ′0,m′1, σ′1)
It follows again from the completeness of BS together with the construction of the
generic forgery oracle (which works even for pseudorandom input instead of truly ran-
dom coins) that the magic adversary succeeds in the unforgeability experiment with
probability negligibly close to 1.
We note that, if we only consider reductions with an a-priori fixed number q of resets
in each row, then we could let the adversary use its randomness to implement q-wise
independent hash functions instead of pseudorandom functions (similar to [BL02] and
our result for statistical blindness). However, in case of computationally (but not
statistically) blind signature schemes relative to Σc,aug, pseudorandom functions relative
to Σc,aug exist anyway and therefore do not require an additional assumption. This
follows as we then have one-way functions relative to Σc,aug [Gol90] and can apply
the (relativizing) constructions [GGM86, HILL99a] to derive pseudorandom functions
relative to Σc,aug.
3.5.2 Impossibility Result
The following theorem extends our impossibility result to the case of computational
blind signature schemes.
Theorem 3.5.7. Let BS be a three-move blind signature scheme, which is blind rela-
tive to the generic forgery oracle Σc and which has (computational) signature-derivation
checks and (computational) key-validity checks relative to Σc. Let PRF be a pseudoran-
dom function relative to Σc,aug. Then there is no resetting (with restricted cross-resets)
black-box reduction from unforgeability of the blind signature scheme BS to a hard non-
interactive problem.
Note again that such pseudorandom functions exist if the blind signature scheme is
computationally but not statistically blind.
The high-level idea of the proof of Theorem 3.5.7 is similar to the proof of Theorem
3.4.4 with the difference that we investigate computational blind signature schemes
and that the reduction is allowed to reset the adversary as often as required (and not
a fixed number). In order to handle resetting attacks we divide the proof in two parts.
In the first part we modify the magic adversary A by substituting the pseudorandom
function through a random function and show that this difference does not change the
success probability of the reduction non-negligibly. This makes the resetting executions
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essentially independent and facilitates the simulation of the reduction through the meta-
reduction.
In the main step of the proof, we then construct a meta-reduction M which mimics
the adversarial behavior (without the help of Σc) by rewinding the reduction R as
described in the proof of Theorem 3.4.4. The difference of both constructions consists
in the last step of the meta-reduction. When M has obtained two message-signature
pairs, then M runs the key-validity check. In the case that this test evaluates to 0,
i.e., that Σc should not be able to output a corresponding secret key and the magic
adversary thus fails to produce a forgery, then M responses with (σ0, σ1) = (⊥,⊥).
Otherwise, if the test outputs 1, then M forwards both signatures to R. We again
show thatM’s behavior and the one of the magic adversary are indistinguishable to R
by the transcript independence of signatures.
Proof. The proof consists of the following steps. We first show that we can safely
replace the pseudorandom function used by A though a truly random function. Then,
we describe the meta-reductionM with expected polynomial running time. To ensure
fixed polynomial running time we next prune the meta-reduction toMr(n). We prove
that the success probability of this pruned meta-reduction is close to the one of the
reduction communicating with A, yielding our desired efficient solver for the underlying
problem.
Replacing PRF by Random Functions. Let APRF be the magic adversary with access
to the pseudorandom function PRF and to the generic forgery oracle Σc,aug. We first
modify APRF to Af by replacing the pseudorandom function through a random function
f in each row, chosen at random when initialized. In particular, different copies with
the same random string rely on the same random function. We argue that this does
not make a non-negligible difference for the reduction R.
Assume towards contradiction that the reduction R outputs a valid solution x′ with
non-negligible probability if R receives message-signature pairs (m0, σ0), (m1, σ1) from
the magic adversary APRF (i.e., with access to PRF), but succeeds only with negligible
probability if the message-signature pairs are generated by the magic adversary Af (i.e.,
with access to random functions). We then construct a distinguisher D who exploits
this difference in these probabilities to successfully distinguish functions from PRF and
random functions. Here we use the version with multiple independent oracles, discussed
after Definition 3.5.5.
The distinguisher D has access to Σc,aug and to q function oracles F1, . . . ,Fq which
accept binary strings as input and return strings of length 2n+ρ(n)+ψ(n). The function
oracles either compute independent pseudorandom functions PRF(ki, ·) or truly random
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functions f1, . . . , fq. The distinguisher works as follows. It first generates an instance
y ← I(1n) of a cryptographic problem P . It starts to simulate the reduction R on input
y, simulating the adversary copies in row i as described in Construction 3.4.3, but using
the function oracle Fi instead of the pseudorandom function. When the reduction finally
outputs an alleged solution x′ the distinguisher D returns b′ ← V (x′, y).
According to our assumption that the reduction R only succeeds with negligible proba-
bility if the message-signatures pairs are generated by Af (i.e., by the magic adversary
A with access to truly random functions) we have
Prob
[
y ← I(1n), x′ ← RAf (y) : V (x′, y) = 1 ∣∣Af ] ≈ 0.
By construction this is identical to the probability that the distinguisher D returns 1,
given that the function oracles F1, . . . ,Fq are given by random functions. On the other
hand,
Prob
[
y ← I(1n), x′ ← RAPRF(y) : V (x′, y) = 1 ∣∣APRF ] 6≈ 0.
and this probability equals the probability that D outputs 1 if the function oracles
implement pseudorandom functions. Overall,
Prob
[
DΣ
c,aug,PRF(k1,·),...,PRF(kq ,·)(1n) = 1
]− Prob[DΣc,aug,f1,...,fq(1n) = 1] 6≈ 0.
But this contradicts the pseudorandomness of PRF.
In conclusion, the magic adversary with access to the truly random function now can
be viewed as follows. Each time the reduction sends a new pair (pk,msg1) in a row the
adversary essentially creates the message-signature pairs independently. For different
rows this even holds for the same pk,msg1 as the random function is independent from
the ones for the other rows. We can now also switch from Σc,aug to Σc as long as we
guarantee that Σc gives identical answers for executions with the same pk,msg1; this
can be easily implemented by table look-ups.
The Final Step. Given that we can again assume independent random choices for the
adversary we next discuss the necessary changes to make the proof of Theorem 3.4.4
go thorugh in this case.
The meta-reduction M here essentially behaves as the one in the proof of Theorem
3.4.4, but differs in the last step for each loop phase. Namely, afterM has computed
two message-signature pairs, it runs the key-validity check on the corresponding public
key. If this check outputs 0, then M sets σ′0, σ′1 ← ⊥. Otherwise, it forwards both
signatures to R.
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The analysis of the meta-reduction is almost identical to the analysis of the meta-
reduction in the proof of Theorem 3.4.4. We again show that any noticeable difference
for the reduction when communicating with the magic adversary or with the meta-
reduction yields a contradiction to the transcript-independence (but now for the com-
putational case). The only difference is that, in that proof we referred to Corollary 3.3.5
to ensure that a failing Σc in the transcript-independence experiment does not prevent
the adversary S∗trans from obtaining the two signatures the meta-reduction would derive.
Here, running the key-validity check by the meta-reduction provides the same guaran-
tee. Only this time we let the meta-reduction artificially fail then, and the conclusion
therefore remains true.
3.5.3 Extension to Four-Move Blind Signature Schemes
A natural question is if our technique can also be used to rule out four-move blind
signature schemes. This, however, does not seem to be the case. First observe that in
a four-move signature-issue protocol the user algorithm sends the first message to the
signer. The problem is that the user might commit itself to the message in this move.
In this case, the reduction might extract the message by resetting the user algorithm.
Applying our technique might allow the meta-reduction to derive further signatures,
but only on the same message. From a more abstract point of view, the reduction
might reset the user (and therefore the meta-reduction) to the point where it has sent
the first message and request another response from the user instance. Our technique
then breaks down, because when we show indistinguishability of the meta-reduction’s
strategy and the one of the magic adversary via blindness, we plug in the communication
from an external non-resettable execution into the reduction at one step.
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4 Blind Signatures and Their
Applications to Adaptive OT
4.1 Introduction
The security requirements for blind signature schemes have been formalized by Juels
et al. [JLO97a] and by Pointcheval and Stern [PS00a]. Although these widely used
definitions give basic security guarantees, blindness only holds in a restricted sense
when it comes to aborted executions. That is, prior work does not guarantee blindness
in case the signer is able to learn which of two executions aborted (even if one execution
aborts only after the protocol has concluded). However, in e-cash scenarios an honest
user, unable to eventually derive a valid coin, will most likely complain to the malicious
bank afterwards. From a theoretical point of view this property is also desirable as
it is needed (among other properties) to build adaptive oblivious transfer from any
unique blind signature scheme in the random oracle. Such a transformation has been
suggested by Camenisch et al. [CNS07] who consider a stronger kind of aborts where a
cheating signer may be able to make the user algorithm fail depending on the message
being signed,1 and where the malicious signer is informed afterwards which execution
has failed (if any).
Related Work. As mentioned before, Camenisch et al. [CNS07] have already con-
sidered the limitations of the standard blindness notion. They have introduced an
extension called selective-failure blindness in which the malicious signer should not be
able to force an honest user to abort the signature issue protocol because of a cer-
tain property of the user’s message, which would disclose some information about the
message to the signer. They present a construction of a simulatable oblivious transfer
protocol from so-called unique selective-failure blind signature schemes (in the random
oracle model) for which the signature is uniquely determined by the message. Since the
main result of the work [CNS07] is the construction of oblivious transfer protocols, the
1Ultimately, since the malicious signer causes the abort, this can be seen as a more general case of
signer aborts.
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authors note that Chaum’s scheme [Cha83b] and Boldyreva’s protocol [Bol03a] are ex-
amples of such selective-failure blind schemes, but do not fully explore the relationship
to (regular) blindness.
Hazay et al. [HKKL07a] present a concurrently-secure blind signature scheme and, as
part of this, they also introduce a notion called a-posteriori blindness. This notion
considers blindness of multiple executions between the signer and the user (as opposed
to two sessions as in the basic case), and addresses the question how to deal with
executions in which the user cannot derive a signature. However, the definition of a-
posteriori blindness is neither known to be implied by ordinary blindness, nor implies it
ordinary blindness (as sketched in [HKKL07a]). Thus, selective-failure blindness does
not follow from this notion.
Aborts of players have also been studied under the notion of fairness in two-party
and multi-party computations, especially for the exchange of signatures, e.g., [Gol04,
ASW98, GMPY06]. Fairness should guarantee that one party obtains the output of
the joint computation if and only if the other party receives it. Note, however, that
in case of blind signatures the protocol only provides a one-sided output to the user
(namely, the signature). In addition, solutions providing fairness usually require extra
assumptions like a trusted third party in case of disputes, or they add a significant
overhead to the underlying protocol.
Our Results in this Section. We pick up the idea of selective-failure blindness to
deal with signer aborts and expand the work of Camenisch et al. [CNS07] towards its
relationship to blindness and further constructions of such schemes. We first show that
selective-failure blindness is indeed a strictly stronger notion than regular blindness. In
[FS09] we also extend the notion of selective-failure blindness to multiple executions,
particularly addressing aborts of a subset of executions. Moreover, we give two possible
definitions for the multi-execution case and prove them to be equivalent. We then show
that blindness in the basic case of two executions suffices to guarantee security in the
case of many sessions and discuss the relation to a-posteriori blindness [HKKL07a].
We omit the definitions from this thesis because they are not required for our final
transformation.
In Section 4.3 we present a general transformation which turns every secure blind sig-
nature scheme into a selective-failure blind scheme. Our transformation only requires
an additional commitment of the message, which the user computes before the actual
protocol starts and which the user then uses in the original protocol instead of the
message itself.2 Since the commitment is non-interactive, our transformation inher-
2This idea has been conjectured by Hazay et al. [HKKL07a] to also work for a-posteriori blindness.
We are not aware of any formal claim or proof in the literature that uses a commitment indeed,
provides security against aborts.
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its important characteristics of the underlying protocol like the number of moves and
concurrent security.
It should be noted, though, that the transformation destroys uniqueness (i.e., that each
message has only one valid signature per key pair), as required by [CNS07] to derive
oblivious transfer from such blind signatures. However, we show that our transformation
is still applicable if we modify the oblivious transfer protocol of [CNS07] slightly. Hence,
we can now easily obtain an adaptive oblivious transfer from any unique blind signature
scheme such that the protocol is simulatable in presence of failures. Put differently, we
show that selective-failure blindness is not necessary to obtain such oblivious transfer
protocols, but uniqueness is sufficient. We note that like the original protocol in [CNS07]
this result holds in the random oracle model.
4.2 Selective-Failure Blindness
In this section we review the definition of selective-failure blindness and show that
selective-failure blindness is a strictly stronger requirement than the basic blindness
property.
4.2.1 Definition
Camenisch et al. [CNS07] put forward the notion of selective-failure blindness, which
roughly says that a malicious signer S∗ cannot force the user’s algorithm U to abort
(based on the specific message) and that blindness should also hold in case the signer
is able to learn that some executions have aborted. This is formalized by informing
S∗ which instance has aborted (i.e., if the left, the right, or both user instances have
failed):
Definition 4.2.1 (Selective-Failure Blindness). A blind signature scheme BS =
(KG, 〈S,U〉 ,Vf) is called selective-failure blind if it is unforgeable (as in Definition 2.3.1)
and if for any efficient algorithm S∗ (which works in modes find, issue, and guess) the
probability that the experiment SFBlindBSS∗(n) evaluates to 1 is negligibly close to 1/2,
where
Experiment SFBlindBSS∗(n)
(pk,m0,m1, βfind)← S∗(find, 1n)
b← {0, 1}
βissue ← S∗〈·,U(pk,mb)〉1,〈·,U(pk,m1−b)〉1(issue, βfind)
and let σb, σ1−b denote the (possibly undefined) local outputs
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of U(pk,mb) resp. U(pk,m1−b).
define answer as: left if only the first execution has failed,
right if only the second execution has failed,
both if both executions have failed,
and (σb, σ1−b) otherwise.
b∗ ← S∗(guess, answer, βissue)
Return 1 iff b = b∗.
4.2.2 Relation to Regular Blindness
We first prove formally the fact that selective-failure blindness implies regular blindness.
Then we separate the notion by turning a secure blind signature scheme into a one which
is still secure but provably not selective-failure blind.
Proposition 4.2.2. Every selective-failure blind signature scheme BSSF is also a secure
blind signature scheme.
Proof. Assume that there exists an adversarial controlled signer A breaking blindness
with noticeable probability. Then we construct an attacker S∗ breaking selective-failure
blindness (with noticeable probability). The adversary S∗ invokes a black-box simula-
tion of A. Whenever A interacts with the user algorithm (as described in the experi-
ment), S∗ forwards the messages (in both directions). At the end of the protocol S∗ is
informed if and which of the protocol executions have failed. In case that at least one
of the user instances has aborted, the adversary S∗ forwards the pair (⊥,⊥) to A, and
otherwise, S∗ obtains two signatures and hands them to A. In both cases, A replies
with a bit b∗, which S∗ too outputs and stops.
A straightforward analysis shows that the success probabilities of S∗ and A in the
corresponding experiment are identical. Moreover, the notions of unforgeability are the
same in both definitions.
Proposition 4.2.3. If there exists a secure blind signature scheme BS, then there exists
a secure blind signature scheme BSSF which is not selective-failure blind.
Proof. We modify BS slightly into a scheme BSSF which is identical to BS, except
that we modify the key generation algorithm by adding a break condition into the user
algorithm. More precisely, let BS = (KG, 〈S,U〉 ,Vf) be a secure blind signature scheme.
We define the new blind signature scheme BSSF:
KeyGen. KGSF first sets mmax = 1
n as the maximum of the lexicographical order over
n-bit strings. It then executes the key generation algorithm of the underlying blind
signature scheme (sk, pk)← KG(1n) and returns (skSF, pkSF) = (sk, (pk,mmax)).
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Signing Protocol. The interactive signing protocol remains unchanged except for
one modification. The user algorithm checks after the last move of the protocol
(and after computing the signature σ) that m ≤ mmax and, if so, it returns the
signature σ, and ⊥ otherwise.
Verification. The verification algorithm returns the result of Vf.
The modified scheme is clearly complete, as the case m > mmax for an honest signer
never occurs and because the initial protocol is complete. Obviously, if the blind sig-
nature scheme BS is unforgeable, then BSSF is also unforgeable. This is easy to see as
the malicious user may simply ignore the break condition.
Concerning blindness, first note that the malicious signer S∗ is allowed to choose the
public key and thus to pick some other value m∗max. As a malicious signer S∗ is not
informed which of the executions has failed (if any), setting some other value m∗max
than the predetermined maximum and possibly causing an abort does not lend any
additional power to S∗. To see this, note that the user algorithm does not abort
prematurely if m > mmax. Hence, from the (malicious) signer’s point of view, the
interaction is indistinguishable from an honest execution. It therefore follows that BSSF
still satisfies blindness.
We finally show that the modified scheme does not fulfill selective-failure blindness.
Consider a malicious signer S∗ in experiment SFBlindBSS∗(n). In the first step the ad-
versary S∗ computes a key pair (sk, pk) ← KG(1n), it sets m∗max = 10n−1 and picks
two messages m0 = 0n,m1 = 1n such that m0 ≤ m∗max < m1. It outputs a public key
pkSF = (pk,m
∗
max) together with the message m0,m1 as defined in the first step of the
experiment. Next, S∗ has black-box access to two honest user instances (as described
in experiment SFBlindBSS∗(n)) where the first algorithm takes as input (pkSF,mb) and the
second user algorithm receives (pkSF,m1−b). In both executions S∗ acts like the honest
signer with key skSF = sk. Then S∗ is eventually informed which of the executions
has failed, i.e., receives left or right (as S∗ has access to honest user instances, the case
where both executions fail cannot occur by the completeness condition). The adversary
S∗ returns b∗ = 1 if the left instance has failed, otherwise it returns b∗ = 0.
It follows straightforwardly that the adversary S∗ succeeds in predicting b with proba-
bility 1.
4.3 From Blindness to Selective-Failure Blindness
In this section we show how to turn every secure blind signature scheme BS into a
selective-failure blind signature scheme BSSF. The high-level idea is to modify BS
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slightly into BSSF by executing BS with a non-interactive commitment Com of the
message m (instead of the message itself).
Definition 4.3.1 (Commitment Scheme). A (non-interactive) commitment scheme
consists of a tuple of efficient algorithms C = (KGcom,Com,VfCom), where
Key Generation. The algorithm KGcom(1n) takes as input the security parameter 1n
and outputs a key pkcom.
Commitment Phase. The input of the algorithm Com is a key pkcom and a message
m ∈ {0, 1}n; It outputs (Decom,Com)← Com(pkcom,m).
Verification. The algorithm VfCom(pkcom,m,Decom,Com) outputs a bit b.
It is assumed that the commitment scheme is complete, i.e., for any n ∈ N, any pkcom ←
KGcom(1
n), for any message m ∈ {0, 1}n, and any (Decom,Com) ← Com(pkcom,m) we
have VfCom(pkcom,m,Decom,Com) = 1.
Security of commitment schemes is defined by secrecy and unambiguity. Secrecy guaran-
tees that the receiver cannot learn the message from the commitment and unambiguity
says that the sender cannot change the message anymore once the commitment phase is
over. Here we use a slightly different way to define secrecy compared to the literature,
but it is easy to see by a hybrid argument that our definition is equivalent:
Definition 4.3.2 (Secure Commitment). A (non-interactive) commitment scheme
C = (KGcom,Com,VfCom) is secure if the following holds:
Secrecy. For any efficient algorithm R∗Com (working in modes find and guess) the
probability that experiment SecrecyCR∗Com(n) evaluates to 1 is negligibly close to 1/2,
where
Experiment SecrecyCR∗Com(n) :
(m0,m1, pkcom, βfind)← R∗Com(find, 1n)
b← {0, 1}
Comb ← Com(pkcom,mb) and Com1−b ← Com(pkcom,m1−b)
b∗ ← R∗Com(guess, βfind,Com0,Com1)
Return 1 iff b = b∗.
Unambiguity. For any efficient algorithm S∗Com the probability that experiment
UnabCS∗Com(n) evaluates to 1 is negligible, where
Experiment UnabCS∗Com(n) :
pkcom ← KGcom(1n)
(m,m′,Decom,Decom′)← S∗Com(pkcom)
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Return 1 iff
VfCom(pkcom,m,Decom,Com) = 1 and
VfCom(pkcom,m′,Decom
′,Com) = 1 as well as m 6= m′.
Note that such commitment schemes exist under standard assumptions like pseudoran-
dom generators [Nao91] or hash functions [DPP97]. In order to use a commitment in a
blind signature scheme —which we defined to take messages of n bits— we need that
the commitment scheme is length-invariant, meaning that for n-bit messages the com-
mitment itself is also n bits. This can always be achieved by using a collision-resistant
hash function (with n bits output) on top.
Signer S(skSF) User U((pk, pkcom),m)
(Decom,Com)← Com(pkcom,m)
S(sk) U(pk,Com)
msg1←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
...
msgn−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ compute σ = σ(Com)
Output m,σ′ = (σ,Decom,Com)
Figure 4.1: Issue protocol of the blind signature scheme BSSF.
Construction 4.3.3 (Selective-Failure Blind Signature Scheme BSSF). We de-
note by BS = (KG, 〈S,U〉 ,Vf) a blind signature scheme and let C be a length-invariant
commitment scheme. We define the blind signature scheme BSSF through the following
three procedures:
Key Generation. The key generation algorithm KGSF(1n) executes the key generation
algorithm of the blind signature scheme BS, e.g., (sk, pk) ← KG(1n). It also runs
the key generation algorithm of the commitment scheme, e.g., pkcom ← KGcom(1n).
It returns the private-key skSF = sk and the public-key pkSF = (pk, pkcom).
Signature Issue Protocol. The interactive signature issue protocol for message
m ∈ {0, 1}n is described in Figure 4.1.
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Signature Verification. The verification algorithm VfSF(pkSF,m, σ′) parses σ′ as
(σ,Decom,Com); it returns 1 iff
Vf(pk, σ,Com) = 1 and VfCom(pkcom,m,Decom,Com) = 1.
Theorem 4.3.4. If BS is a secure blind signature scheme and C is a secure, length-
invariant commitment scheme, then the scheme BSSF in Construction 4.3.3 is a selective-
failure blind signature scheme.
We note that, if the starting blind signature scheme provides statistical blindness, and
the commitment scheme is also statistically-hiding, then the derived protocol achieves
selective-failure blindness in a statistical sense. This can be seen from the proof of The-
orem 4.3.4, which is split into two claims, (1) covering unforgeability and (2) selective-
failure blindness:
Claim 1: BSSF is unforgeable.
Intuitively, in the proof we distinguish between two cases. The first case occurs if the ad-
versary U∗ succeeds in outputting k+1 valid pairs of the formmi, σ′i = (σi,Decomi,Comi)
such that the commitments Comi are pairwise different. However, we can then can break
the unforgeability of the underlying blind signature scheme BS. In the second case U∗
succeeds and at least two commitments Comi,Comj (with i 6= j) are identical. But then
we can break the unambiguity of the commitment scheme C.
Proof. Assume to the contrary that the resulting selective-failure blind signature scheme
BSSF is not unforgeable. Then there exists an adversary U∗ breaking unforgeability with
noticeable probability, i.e., on input pkSF the algorithm U∗ returns k+1 valid signatures
σ′i = (σi,Decomi,Comi) for messages mi after at most k interactions with the honest
signer S. Note that here we do not deal with user aborts and count any initiated
interaction; the case of counting only completed interactions is taken care of in the
next section.
We first take a look at the success probability of U∗, where we have
ψ(n) := Prob
[
ForgeBSSFU∗ (n) = 1
]
where ψ(n) is noticeable. This probability can be separated according to the two
exclusive events that U∗ succeeds and all commitments Comi are different, with the
corresponding probability denoted by ψ0(n), and into the case where ASF succeeds
and at least two commitments are identical (with probability ψ1(n)) According to our
assumption that ψ(n) is noticeable, ψ0(n) or ψ1(n) (or both) must be noticeable.
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We next construct out of U∗ algorithms AUNF and AUNA against unforgeability of BS
and unambiguity of the commitment scheme C.
Attacking Unforgeability. The adversary AUNF takes as input the public key pk of
the blind signature scheme BS and works as follows. It executes the key generation
algorithm of the commitment scheme pkcom ← KGcom(1n) and runs a black-box simu-
lation of U∗ on input pkSF = (pk, pkcom). The signer instances in the attack of U∗ are
simulated with the help of the external signer instances accessible by AUNF, i.e., adver-
sary AUNF relays the communication between U∗ and its signer instance oracle S(sk)
(as described in experiment ForgeBSU∗). When U∗ finishes its attack, it outputs k + 1
message-signatures pairs mi, σ′i after at most k interactions. Now AUNF parses each σ′i
as (σi,Decomi,Comi), returns the k + 1 pairs Comi, σi, and stops.
Assume that ψ0(n), the probability that U∗ succeeds and all Comi’s are distinct, is
noticeable. Then, since the simulation is perfect from the viewpoint of U∗, adversary
AUNF succeeds in outputting k + 1 valid pairs Comi, σi for distinct “messages” Comi
with noticeable probability, too, contradicting the unforgeability property of the under-
lying blind signature scheme. Note also that the numbers of initiated and completed
executions are identical in both cases.
Attacking Unambiguity. In order to break the unambiguity of C, the adversary AUNA
takes as input the public key pkcom of the commitment scheme C and works as follows. It
executes the key generation algorithm of the blind signature scheme (sk, pk)← KG(1n)
as well as the honest signer algorithms S(sk) and it runs a black-box simulation of
U∗ on input pkSF = (pk, pkcom). Note that running the program of the honest signer
on input sk simulates each execution with a signer instance. Algorithm U∗ eventually
returns k+ 1 message-signature pairs (mi, σ′i) after at most k interactions with S. The
adversary AUNA then checks if there are valid signatures with Comi = Comj for some
i 6= j and, if so, outputs two tuples (mi,Decomi,Comi), (mj,Decomj,Comj) such that
mi 6= mj and Comi = Comj. If not, it outputs a failure message.
For the analysis note that the simulation again perfectly mimics the original attack of
U∗. Hence, if ψ1(n) is noticeable, then such Comi = Comj with valid decommitments
for mi 6= mj appear with noticeable probability, and the commitment adversary AUNA
therefore finds an ambiguous commitment with this probability, too. But this clearly
violates the security of the commitment scheme C.
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Claim 2: BSSF is selective-failure blind.
The high-level idea of the proof is as follows. We again distinguish between two cases. In
the first case the adversary ASF succeeds with noticeable probability and both message-
signature pairs are valid. But then we show how to break the blindness property of
the underlying blind signature scheme BS. We next argue that in the case where ASF
succeeds with noticeable probability and forces at least one of the user algorithms to
fail, then we are able to break the secrecy of the commitment scheme (because then the
only information available to the signer are the commitments of the messages).
Proof. Assume towards contradiction that the resulting blind signature scheme BSSF
is not selective-failure blind, and that there exists a successful adversary ASF against
selective-failure blindness. Let
δ(n) := Prob
[
SFBlindBSASF(n) = 1
]
= 1
2
+ (n),
where (n) = δ(n) − 1
2
is noticeable. We divide the success case according to the two
exclusive events that ASF succeeds and that both message-signature pairs are valid
(event valid) and into the case where ASF succeeds and at least one of the signatures is
not valid (event ¬valid). Then,
Prob
[
SFBlindBSASF(n) = 1
]− 1
2
= Prob[ valid] · (Prob[SFBlindBSASF(n) = 1 ∣∣ valid]− 12)
+ Prob[¬valid] · (Prob[SFBlindBSASF(n) = 1 ∣∣¬valid]− 12) .
According to our assumption that δ(n) is noticeable, either the first term, denoted
δ0(n), or the second term δ1(n) has to be noticeable (or both are noticeable). We next
turn ASF into algorithms Ablind and Acom against regular blindness and secrecy of the
commitment scheme, respectively.
Attacking Blindness. The adversary Ablind works as follows. It runs a black-box
simulation of ASF, which initially outputs two messages (m0,m1) together with a
public key pkSF. The adversary Ablind extracts pk and pkcom from pkSF and calcu-
lates the commitments (and decommitments) (Decom0,Com0) ← Com(pkcom,m0) and
(Decom1,Com1) ← Com(pkcom,m1). It outputs Com0,Com1 and pk. It is then given
access to two user instances U(pk,Comb) and U(pk,Com1−b) for a unknown bit b and
relays the communication between these instances and ASF. If, at the end, at least
one of the (external) user algorithms fails, then Ablind outputs a random bit and stops.
Otherwise, it augments σ0, σ1 to σ′0 = (σ0,Decom0,Com0) and σ′1 = (σ1,Decom1,Com1)
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and returns the two signatures σ′0, σ′1 (obtained by the external user algorithms) to ASF.
The final output of Ablind consists of the bit b∗ returned by ASF.
Note that Ablind simulates the experiment SFBlindBSASF(n) by executing the blindness
experiment for the underlying blind signature scheme BS and by computing the com-
mitments internally. Hence, the case where both message-signature pairs are valid is
the one where experiment SFBlindBSASF(n) is identical to experiment Blind
BS
Ablind(n). If one
of the signatures is invalid, then Ablind returns a random bit. Therefore, the success
probability of Ablind in experiment BlindBSAblind(n) can be calculated as:
Prob
[
BlindBSAblind(n) = 1
]
= Prob[ b = b∗ ∧ ¬valid] + Prob[ b = b∗ ∧ valid]
= Prob[ b = b∗ | valid ] · Prob[ valid] + Prob[ b = b∗ | ¬valid ] · Prob[¬valid] .
= Prob[ valid] · Prob[ b = b∗ | valid ] + 1
2
· (1− Prob[ valid])
= Prob[ valid] · Prob[SFBlindBSASF(n) = 1 ∣∣ valid]+ 12 · (1− Prob[ valid])
= 1
2
+ Prob[ valid] · (Prob[SFBlindBSASF(n) = 1 ∣∣ valid]− 12)
= 1
2
+ δ0(n).
According to our assumption that δ0(n) is noticeable it follows that Ablind breaks the
blindness of the underlying blind signature scheme BS with noticeable probability. This,
however, contradicts our assumption that BS is a secure blind signature scheme.
Attacking Secrecy of the Commitment. In order to break the secrecy of the com-
mitment scheme C, the adversary Acom executes a black-box simulation of ASF, which
initially outputs two messages (m0,m1) as well as a public key pkSF. The adversaryAcom
extracts the keys pkcom and pk from pkSF and outputs (m0,m1, pkcom) for the secrecy
experiment of the commitment scheme. It then receives two commitments Com0,Com1,
one for message mb and the other one for message m1−b (without knowing which com-
mitment corresponds to which message).
The adversary now runs (in the role of the honest user U(pk,Com0) and U(pk,Com1))
the selective-failure blindness experiment with ASF. At the end of the issue protocol
each user instance returns either a signature for the commitment or ⊥. In the case that
both user algorithms return a valid signature, then Acom outputs a random bit b∗ and
stops. Otherwise, if both user algorithms have failed, then Acom sends the value both
to ASF. In the case that the first user algorithm has failed, then Acom returns left to
ASF and else (if the second user algorithm has failed), it forwards right to ASF. The
final output of Acom consists of the bit b∗ returned by ASF.
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The adversary Acom simulates the experiment of selective-failure blindness perfectly,
up to the point where it obtains the (possibly undefined) signatures. Given that at
least one of them is invalid, the simulation corresponds to the case SFBlindBSASF(n) (given
¬valid) for the same choice b as in the commitment experiment. Else, Acom outputs a
random bit. Thus,
Prob
[
SecrecyCR∗Com(n) = 1
]
= Prob[ b = b∗ ∧ valid] + Prob[ b = b∗ ∧ ¬valid]
= Prob[ b = b∗ | ¬valid ] · Prob[¬valid] + Prob[ b = b∗ | valid ] · Prob[ valid]
= Prob[¬valid] · Prob[ b = b∗ | ¬valid ] + 1
2
· (1− Prob[¬valid])
= Prob[¬valid] · Prob[SFBlindBSASF(n) = 1 ∣∣¬valid]+ 12 · (1− Prob[¬valid])
= 1
2
+ Prob[¬valid] · (Prob[SFBlindBSASF(n) = 1 ∣∣¬valid]− 12)
= 1
2
+ δ1(n).
If δ1(n) is noticeable, it follows that Acom breaks the secrecy of the commitment scheme
with noticeable probability, contradicting the security of C.
4.4 Selective Failures and Adaptive Oblivious
Transfer
Camenisch et al. [CNS07] also show how to construct an adaptive oblivious transfer
protocol out of any unique selective-failure blind signature scheme (in the random oracle
model). Roughly speaking, uniqueness means that each message has only one signature
per public key. More formally, a blind signature scheme is unique [GO93, CNS07] if for
every (possibly maliciously chosen) public key pk and every message m ∈ {0, 1}∗, there
exists at most one signature s ∈ {0, 1}∗ such that Vf(pk,m, s) = 1.
In this section we focus on the question whether our transformation turning every
blind signature into one with selective-failure blindness is applicable. We have already
mentioned in the introduction of this section that the initial commitment destroys
uniqueness of the blind signature scheme because each message may have several valid
signatures per key pair. Here we show that it is nonetheless possible to build an adap-
tive k-out-of-N oblivious transfer protocol out of any unique blind signature scheme by
applying our transformation. The following construction is a modification of the pro-
tocol in [CNS07] and, because of the problems with uniqueness, we have to prove the
security of this construction from scratch, digging also into the proof of selective-failure
blindness for our transformation.
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4.4.1 Simulatable Adaptive Oblivious Transfer
Oblivious transfer (OT), proposed by Rabin [Rab81], is an interactive protocol between
a sender S and a receiver R. The sender in this protocol gets as input N messages
m1, . . . ,mN and the receiver R wishes to retrieve the message mc. OT protocols must
satisfy the following two security properties: firstly, the sender S does not find out the
receiver’s choice c ∈ {1, . . . , N} and, secondly, the receiver only obtainsmc and does not
gain any information about the other messages mi for i 6= c. For adaptive k-out-of-N
oblivious transfer, OTNk×1, the receiver requests k of these N messages in rounds where
the i-th choice is based on the previously obtained messages. We refer the reader to
[CNS07, NP05] for detailed informations. Following [CNS07] closely we define adaptive
oblivious transfer more formally. An adaptive k-out-of-N oblivious transfer scheme
OTNk×1 is a tuple of efficient algorithms (SI,RI, ST,RT) that consists of an initialization
phase and a transfer phase. During the initialization phase the sender and the receiver
perform an interactive protocol where the sender executes the algorithm SI on input
(m1,m2, . . . ,mN) and the receiver runs the algorithm RI without any input. At the
end of the initialization protocol both parties output some (local) state information,
denoted by S0 and R0, respectively.
Once the initialization phase is over, both parties engage in a transfer protocol. During
the i-th transfer, where 1 ≤ i ≤ k, the sender runs the algorithm ST(Si−1) to obtain
some state information Si whereas the receiver runs the RT(Ri−1, ci) algorithm on input
state information Ri−1 and its choice ci indicating which message it wishes to receive.
The receiver obtains some state information Ri together with the retrieved message
m′ci . A scheme is complete if m
′
ci
= mci for all messages m1, . . . ,mN , for all selections
c1, . . . , ck ∈ {1, . . . , N}, and for all coin tosses of the algorithms. Roughly speaking,
security of oblivious transfer demands that the receiver only learns the chosen mes-
sages (sender security) and the sender does not know which messages has been chosen
(receiver security). In the following we briefly recall (partly verbatim) the security def-
initions by Camenisch et al. [CNS07]. In contrast to the definition of Naor and Pinkas
[NP05] it employs the real-world/ideal-world paradigm for both sender and receiver se-
curity (simulatable oblivious transfer). This paradigm compares the execution of an OT
protocol in the real-world with an ideal implementation (see for example [Can00]). In
the real-world experiment, both parties jointly execute the interactive protocol, whereas
in the ideal-world the functionality is realized through a trusted third party. Informally,
security requires that the malicious receiver/sender gains in the real-world no more in-
formation than in the ideal-world. To capture failures one allows the ideal model sender
to transmit a bit b, indicating whether the transfer should succeed or abort. We note
that this bit is independent of the choice of the receiver, reflecting the fact that the
abort should not depend on the receiver’s input.
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Real Experiment. We begin with the description of the real-world experiment that
involves arbitrary sender and receiver algorithms S∗real and R∗real. The experiment
RealS∗real,R∗real(N, k,m1, . . . ,mN , c1, . . . , ck)
works as follows. Algorithm S∗real on input (m1, . . . ,mN) interacts with R∗real that obtains
no input. Both parties generate an initial state S0 and R0, respectively. Afterwards,
the sender and the receiver perform k interactions. During the i-th execution, for
1 ≤ i ≤ k, the sender and receiver interact by running Si ← S∗real(Si−1) and (Ri,m′ci)←
R∗real(Ri−1, ci) where ci ∈ {1, . . . , N} is a message index. It is understood that both
algorithm update their state information to Si and Ri, respectively. Observe that m′ci
andmci are not necessarily identical if either party cheats. The output of the experiment
RealS∗real,R∗real is the tuple (Sk, Rk) of the final state information.
Next, we define the behavior of the honest sender and honest receiver algorithm. That
is, the honest sender algorithm Sreal in an OTNk×1 scheme (SI, ST,RI,RT) takes as input a
set of messages (m1, . . . ,mN), it runs the algorithm SI(m1, . . . ,mN) in the initialization
phase and runs the ST algorithm in all following interactions. This algorithm always
returns Sk =  as its final state. The honest receiver algorithm Rreal runs the algorithm
RI during the initialization phase, the algorithm RT during the transfer phase and stops,
outputting the list of received messages Rk = (m′c1 , . . . ,m
′
ck
) as its final state.
Ideal Experiment. In the ideal-world experiment
IdealS∗ideal,R∗ideal(N, k,m1, . . . ,mN , c1, . . . , ck),
the (possibly malicious) sender algorithm S∗ideal(m1, . . . ,mN) generates N messages
(m′1,m
′
2, . . . ,m
′
N) and hands these over to the trusted party T . In each of the k trans-
fers, T receives a bit bi and afterwards an index c′i of the (possibly cheating) receiver
R∗ideal. If bi = 1 and c′i ∈ {1, . . . , N}, then T sends the message m′ci to the receiver, and
otherwise, ⊥. The output of the experiment Ideal is the tuple (Si, Ri) of the final state
information of S∗ideal and R∗ideal, respectively.
As above, we now define the honest ideal sender as well as the honest ideal receiver. The
honest ideal sender Sideal(m1, . . . ,mN) sends the messages m1, . . . ,mN to the trusted
party T in the initialization phase, during the i-th transfer it hands the bit bi = 1 over
to T and outputs Sk =  as its final state. The honest ideal-world receiver Rideal submits
its real choice (c1, c2, . . . , ck) to the trusted party and outputs the obtained messages
Rk = (m
′
1,m
′
2, . . . ,m
′
k) as its final state.
Sender’s security. We say that an OTNk×1 is sender secure if for any efficient cheat-
ing real-world receiver R∗real there exists an efficient ideal-world receiver R∗ideal
such that for any polynomial Nq(n), any N ∈ {1, . . . , Nq(n)}, any message
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m1,m2, . . . ,mN , and for any choice c1, c2, . . . , ck ∈ {1, . . . , N} with k ∈ {1, . . . , N},
the advantage for any efficient distinguisher D in distinguishing the distributions
RealSreal,R∗real(N, k,m1, . . . ,mN , c1, . . . , ck)
and
IdealS′ideal,R
′∗
ideal
(N, k,m1, . . . ,mN , c1, . . . , ck)
is negligible in n.
Receiver’s security. We say that an OTNk×1 is receiver secure if for any efficient
real-world malicious sender S∗real, there exists an efficient ideal-world sender S∗ideal
such that for any polynomial Nm(q), any N ∈ {1, . . . , Nm(q)}, any message
m1,m2, . . . ,mN , for any choice c1, c2, . . . , ck ∈ {1, . . . , N} with k ∈ {1, . . . , N},
the advantage for any efficient distinguisher D in distinguishing the distributions
RealS∗real,Rreal(N, k,m1, . . . ,mN , c1, . . . , ck)
and
IdealS′∗ ideal,R′ideal(N, k,m1, . . . ,mN , c1, . . . , ck)
is negligible in n.
4.4.2 Construction
Our construction, depicted in Figure 4.2, is a modification of the OTNk×1 protocol of Ca-
menisch et al. and consists of a black-box construction using any unique (not necessarily
selective-failure) blind signature scheme. The sender in the first step of the protocol
generates a key-pair for the blind signature scheme and sends it to the receiver. The
receiver, in return, hands N distinct commitments (for values 1, 2, . . . , N , represented
as n-bit-strings each) over to the sender. These commitments serve as “messages” for
the signature generation. Note that distinctiveness of the commitments holds with high
probability by the binding property.
After the sender has verified that all commitments are distinct, it encrypts each message
in its database by xor-ing the message mi with H(i, si), where i is the index of the
i-th commitment Comi and si is the unique signature of message Comi under pk. The
sender can easily compute this signature locally by running the signature issue protocol
with the help of the signing key and an honest user instance for “message” Comi.
After having finished the initialization phase, both parties engage in a transfer phase
that consists of a run of the unique blind signature scheme. In the case that the receiver
wishes to obtain the i-th message mi, then it has to choose the commitment Comi (as
the message to be signed) during the signature issue protocol.
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Sender SI(m1, . . . ,mN) : Initialization Receiver RI :
(pkSF, skSF)← KGSF(1n)
pkSF−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ parse pkSF as (pk, pkcom)
for i = 1, . . . , N
(Decomi,Comi)← Com(pkcom, i)
check that Comi 6= Comj Com1, . . . ,ComN←−−−−−−−−−−−−−− s.t. Comi 6= Comj for all i 6= j
for all i 6= j
for i = 1, . . . , N
si ← 〈S(sk),U(pk,Comi)〉
Ci ← H(i, si)⊕mi C1, . . . , CN−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
set S0 ← sk set R0 ← (pkSF, (Comi, Ci)i=1,...,N)
output S0 output R0
Sender ST(Si−1) : Transfer Receiver RT(Ri−1, Ri) :
parse Si−1 as sk parse Ri−1 as (pkSF, (Comi, Ci)i=1,...,N))
execute S(sk) Unique-BS←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ execute scj ← U(pk,Comcj)
if Vf(pk,Comci , sci) = 0
then mci ← ⊥
else mci ← Cci ⊕H(i, sci)
output Si = Si−1 output Ri = (Ri−1,m′ci)
Figure 4.2: A k-out-of-N oblivious transfer protocol using a random oracle H and any unique
blind signature scheme BS.
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From a high-level point of view unforgeability guarantees that the receiver cannot re-
ceive more messages than interactions took place (sender’s security) and blindness guar-
antees that the sender cannot tell which message has been signed (receiver’s security).
4.4.3 Security of Our Construction
The security of the oblivious transfer protocol follows from the security of the unique
blind signature scheme and from the security of the commitment scheme.
Theorem 4.4.1. If the unique blind signature scheme BS is unforgeable then the OTNk×1
scheme depicted in Figure 4.2 is sender-secure in the random oracle model.
Proof. In the following, we build for any malicious real-world receiver R∗real an ideal-
world receiver R∗ideal that works as follows. The algorithm R∗ideal first generates a key-pair
(skSF, pkSF)← KGSF(1n) for any unique blind signature scheme according to Construc-
tion 4.3.3. It forwards pkSF to R∗real and receives in return N commitments Comi. After-
wards, R∗real checks whether all commitments are distinct, and if so, it picks N random
strings Ci ← {0, 1}n and sends these values to R∗real to obtain the initial state R0.
During the transfer phase the ideal-world sender R∗ideal simulates the honest signer of
the unique blind signature scheme and engages in k executions of the signature issue
protocol with R∗real. In order to answer the random oracle queries, the algorithm R∗ideal
stores an initially empty associative array HT[·] together with a counter ctr. Whenever
R∗real invokes its random oracle H(·) on a value x, then the algorithm R∗ideal returns
HT[x]. In the case that this entry in undefined, then R∗ideal proceeds as follows:
If x = (i, si) and Vf(pk,Comi, si) = 1 and i ∈ [1, N ] then
ctr← ctr + 1; If ctr > k, then abort
Obtain mi from the ideal functionality
HT[x]← mi ⊕ Ci
else HT[x]← {0, 1}`.
Finally, at the end of the simulation, the algorithm R∗real outputs its final state which
R∗ideal also outputs and stops.
It follows easily form the construction of R∗ideal that the algorithm is efficient because
R∗real runs in polynomial time and because the overhead of the key generation, of the
simulation of the honest signer algorithm, as well as the overhead of computing the
verification equation, can all be performed efficiently. It is also clear that R∗ideal performs
a perfect simulation of the real-world experiment as long as R∗ideal does not abort. Thus,
there does not exist a distinguisher that is able to distinguish the real-world experiment
from the ideal-world experiment with noticeable probability.
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In the following we show that R∗ideal does not cause R∗real to abort with noticeable proba-
bility. To do so, let assume towards contradiction that the algorithm R∗ideal causes R∗real to
abort. But then we are able to build a forger F that breaks the unforgeability of BS with
noticeable probability. Algorithm F performs a similar simulation of the environment
but with two differences. Firstly, the algorithm F does not generate the keys for the
blind signature scheme, but forwards the messages between its (external) signing oracle
and R∗real. Secondly, it does not abort if ctr > k, but it outputs all k+1 tuples (Comi, si)
where (i, si) is the query sent by R∗real to its random oracle. Observe that according to
our protocol, all commitments have to be distinct and that R∗real can engage in at most
k transfer protocols. Thus, F outputs k+ 1 different messages together with k+ 1 valid
signature after at most k executions of the signature issue protocol. This, however,
contradicts the assumption that the blind signature scheme BS is unforgeable.
Theorem 4.4.2. If BS is a secure blind signature scheme and C is a secure, length-
invariant commitment scheme, then the OTNk×1 scheme depicted in Figure 4.2 is receiver-
secure in the random oracle model.
Proof. The proofs follows the one in [CNS07] closely. We have to show that for any
efficient cheating real-world sender S∗real, there exists an efficient ideal-world sender S∗ideal
such that the outputs of both algorithm are (computational) indistinguishable. This
ideal-world algorithm S∗ideal works as follows. On input a set of messages (m1,m2, . . . ,mN),
algorithm S∗ideal executes a black-box simulation of S∗real on these messages and an-
swers each random-oracle query by returning random values (but consistently). Let
pkSF = (pk, pkcom) be the first outgoing message produced by S∗real. The attacker S∗ideal
now computes N distinct commitments Comi ← Com(pkcom, 0n) and feeds them into
S∗real. Now, consider all random-oracle queries (i, si) with 1 ≤ i ≤ N made by S∗real.
For each query (i, si), algorithm S′real checks whether Vf(pk,Comj, sj) = 1 for some
1 ≤ j ≤ N and if so, it stores qj ← H(j, sj). During the last move of the initializa-
tion phase the algorithm S∗real outputs the values C1, . . . , CN . Next, algorithm S∗ideal sets
m′i ← Ci⊕qi for all 1 ≤ i ≤ N if qi is defined, or if qi is not defined, it sets m′i ← {0, 1}n
to a random value and submits (m′1, . . . ,m′N) to the trusted party.
In the following we have to handle the k transfer steps. To handle these queries, S∗ideal
sets R0 ← (pkSF,Comi, Ci) for i = 1, . . . , N and simulates the environment of S∗real
during the i-th transfer by running Ri ← RT(Ri−1, 1), i.e., by always executing the
honest receiver algorithm that wishes to receive the message m1. Observe that S∗ideal
does not get the choices (c1, c2, . . . , ck) as input, thus it cannot run RT on the real choice
ci. At the end of the i-th transfer phase, algorithm RT may output ⊥. In this case,
algorithm S∗ideal submits bi = 0 to the trusted party indicating that this execution should
be aborted, and otherwise, it sends bi = 1.
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Algorithm S∗ideal simulates the transfer phase perfectly, i.e., queries of the form (i, si)
with 1 ≤ i ≤ N and Vf(pk, i, s) = 1 are answered with Ci ⊕ m′i; other queries are
answered with random values (but consistently). Finally, after having terminated k
transfer queries, S∗real outputs some state Sk which S∗ideal also outputs and stops.
We use a standard hybrid argument (analogously to [CNS07]) to analyze the advan-
tage of a distinguisher D in distinguishing between the experiments RealS∗real,Rreal and
ldealS∗ideal,Rideal . By S
∗
ideal,i we denote an algorithm that simulates the environment of S∗real
identical to S∗ideal except that it uses Ri ← RT(Ri−1, 1) for the first i transfer executions,
and which uses Ri ← RT(Ri−1, ci) for the remaining k − i transfers. We further denote
by Game-i the output of the corresponding experiment, i.e., it contains the final state of
S∗ideal,i as well as the state of the honest ideal receiver Rideal(c1, . . . , ck) after interacting
with the trusted party T. Obviously, Game-0 corresponds to the real world experi-
ment, i.e., Game-0 = RealS∗real,Rreal and Game-k equals to our ideal-world experiment,
i.e., Game-k = IdealS∗ideal,Rideal . The hybrid argument says that if there exists an efficient
algorithm D that is able to distinguish the distributions RealS∗real,Rreal and ldealS∗ideal,Rideal
with noticeable advantage , then there must exist an index 0 ≤ i ≤ k such that D
distinguishes Game-i and Game-(i + 1) with probability at least /k.
Next observe that the proof of Theorem 4.3.4, which says that every blind signature
scheme is selective-failure blind when executed with an a-priori commitment, still holds.
To see this note that we distinguish between two cases in this proof. Firstly, if no
execution aborts then we can break blindness of the underlying blind signature scheme
and, secondly, if at least one execution aborts then it is possible to break secrecy of the
commitment scheme (see the proof of Claim 2). In the proof of Claim 2 the adversary
receives the commitments of the messages (in random order) at the outset.
In the last step of the proof we have to show that we can use an algorithm D, that distin-
guishes between the games Game-i and Game-(i + 1), to break selective-failure blindness
of BS. To do so, we construct an algorithm ASF that runs a black-box simulation of
S∗real, that extracts the message and answers all random oracle queries as described for
S∗ideal. The algorithm ASF simulates the first j-th queries running algorithm RT(·, 1),
setting m′j = ⊥ if the transfer fails, and otherwise mj = mcj .
During the (i + 1)-th execution, the algorithm ASF behaves as follows. It outputs
the tuple (pk,m0 = Com(pkcom, ci),m1 = Com(pkcom, 1)) according to the first step of
the (selective-failure) blindness experiment. In the next step of the experiment, ASF
interacts with two honest user instances U(pk,mb) and U(pk,m1−b) for a randomly
chosen bit b in the following way. It relays the entire communication between S∗real and
the first user oracle U(pk,mb), whereas it simply aborts the execution with the second
oracle.
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Algorithm ASF eventually receives the signatures (s0, s1), encoding the answer right or
both. In the case that the issuing in the first execution succeeds, i.e., if s0 6= ⊥, it sets
m′i+1 = mci+1 . Otherwise let m′i+1 = ⊥. We remark that here selective-failure blindness
(as opposed to regular blindness) is necessary in order to obtain the information about
the left execution.
Analogously to our description above, ASF answers the remaining i+2 ≤ j ≤ k transfers
with the algorithm RT(·, cj), setting m′j = mcj if the transfer succeeds, and otherwise,
m′j = ⊥. Finally, when algorithm S∗real outputs its final state Sk, then ASF runs the
distinguisher D on input (Sk, (m′1, . . . ,m′k)). Note that if b = 0, then this tuple is dis-
tributed according to Game-i and in the case that b = 1 it is distributed like Game-(i + 1).
Thus, algorithm ASF returns the output of D and wins the game with probability at
least 1/2 + /k.
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5 On the Impossibility of Blind
Signatures From One-Way
Permutations
5.1 Introduction
Several constructions of blind signature schemes are known based on specific number-
theoretic assumptions in either the random oracle model [PS00b, Abe01b, BNPS03a,
Bol03b, AO09] or the standard model [CKW04b, Oka06b, HK07, KZ08, AFG+10].
Blind signatures can also be build from oblivious transfer in a black-box way using
techniques from secure two-party computation [LP07]. Constructions based on gen-
eral assumptions are also known [JLO97b, Fis06b, HKKL07b, FS09], but the minimal
assumptions needed to construct blind signatures are unclear. On the positive side,
there exist constructions of blind signature schemes based on any trapdoor permuta-
tion [JLO97b, Fis06b]. Interestingly, the known constructions are all non black-box
even in the honest-but-curious setting, with the construction by Juels, Luby, and Os-
trovsky [JLO97b] applying techniques from secure two-party computation and the con-
struction by Fischlin [Fis06b] using non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs. Since (stan-
dard) signature schemes can be constructed in a black-box way based on any one-way
function [NY89, Rom90], there is no reason a priori to believe that blind signatures
cannot be constructed from one-way functions also. Here, we settle the question in the
negative:
Theorem 5.1.1 (Main Theorem). There is no black-box construction of a blind sig-
nature scheme from one-way functions.
Our result imposes no restrictions on the blind signature scheme, and applies even to
schemes with imperfect completeness. Moreover, it is actually quite a bit more general
than the above theorem indicates. In particular, our impossibility result applies also
to constructions based on one-way permutations or random oracles, and even rules out
constructions of blind signature schemes for 1-bit messages that achieve security only
against honest-but-curious parties.
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The proof of our impossibility result requires a careful combination of prior techniques
in the area of black-box separations. At a high level, our basic framework is similar to
the one used by Barak and Mahmoody-Ghidary in the context of of black-box construc-
tions of (standard) signature schemes from one-way functions [BMG07]. Our setting
introduces several additional difficulties, however, not least of which is that we must also
deal with the case of interactive protocols. Also, Barak and Mahmoody-Ghidary prove
limits on the efficiency of the construction, whereas we are interested in proving impos-
sibility. To deal with these complications, we also rely on techniques used in analyzing
constructions of key-agreement protocols from one-way functions [IR89, BMG09].
5.2 Overview of Our Techniques
We begin by giving a high-level overview of our proof techniques. The full details are
given in Sections 5.4.3 and 5.4.4. We consider an interactive signature issue protocol
between a signer and a user. The input of the signer is a private key sk and the user’s
input is a public key pk and a message m. At the end of this protocol the user outputs
a signature σ on the message m. Both of the algorithms are given black-box access to
either a one-way function (OWF) or a one-way permutation (OWP). We assume that
both players follow the protocol and are just honest-but-curious (semi-honest). We
allow the players to be computationally unbounded, but require that they only query
the one-way function (resp. permutation) a polynomial number of times.
In the setting of blind signatures, security demands that:
Unforgeability The user should not be able to output two valid signatures after inter-
acting with the signer once. (More generally, the user should be unable to output
k + 1 valid signatures on distinct messages after interacting with the signer k
times.)
Blindness If the user executes the signature-issue protocol twice, once using a mes-
sage m0 and once using a message m1, then the signer should be unable to tell
which order these executions were run. This should hold even if the signer is given
both of the resulting signatures.
If we consider schemes that only achieve property (a), then it is well-known that these
can be built in a black-box way from any OWF [Rom90] as this is just a standard
signature scheme. On the other hand, schemes that are only blind but trivially forgeable
can be constructed without any assumption letting the verification algorithm always
output 1.
We show that if we wish to satisfy both conditions above then OWFs are not sufficient.
To illustrate the main idea why this is true, consider the setting where both the user
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and signer are given access to a random oracle. Let Q denote the oracle queries made
by the signer in generating its public and private keys. Now consider two protocol
executions in which the user first obtains a signature on the message m0 and then
obtains a signature on the message m1. Correctness intuitively requires that in each
interaction the user learns sufficiently many of the queries in Q in order to be abe to
derive a valid signature. Unforgeability requires that the user does not learn “too many”
of the queries in Q in each interaction; in particular, the user should not learn enough
queries in the first interaction to derive a valid signature on m1. Finally, blindness
implies that, from the point of view of the signer, the queries the user learns in the first
interaction should be distributed identically to the queries the user learns in the second
interaction. We show that all these requirements are in conflict.
More formally, we rely on results of [IR89, BMG09] showing that for any two-party
protocol there is an algorithm Findδ that takes as input a transcript of an execution of
the protocol and outputs, with high probability, a set that contains every oracle query
that was asked by both parties (“intersection queries”). Noting that the signer can run
this algorithm, the blindness requirement thus implies that the set obtained by running
Findδ on the signature-issue protocol for m0 must contain a set of intersection queries
that are sufficient to derive a signature on the message m1. (Else the signer knows that
the first execution could not possibly have been for m1.) We use this to construct a
forger, which is a more efficient version of the one given in [BMG07]. Our forger runs
a single protocol execution honestly to obtain a signature on m0, and then runs Findδ
to learn all the intersection queries. By what we have just said, this set will contain
enough information to allow the forger to also compute a valid signature on m1. More
precisely, the forger executes the following attack:
1. Input Key Generation. The forger gets as input a public key pk.
2. Request Signature. Engage in an interactive signature issue protocol using the
honest user algorithm on the message 0 to get a signature σ0.
3. Learning Oracle Queries. Let trans0 be the transcript that corresponds to the
above protocol execution. Then first run the algorithm Findδ to compute the set
I0 that contains the set of intersection queries and then also run the verification
algorithm on the signature σ0 corresponding to 0.
4. Sampling a Possible Transcript. Conditioned on the knowledge learned from
the previous step, i.e., all query/answer pairs that the user and the verification
algorithm made and also all query/answer pairs determined by Findδ, guess a
secret key s˜k and an oracle O˜ that agree with the information collected about the
real secret key and oracle O.
5. Forging. Forge a signature for 1 using the key s˜k and the oracle O˜, by running
the signature issue protocol locally.
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Using the blindness property of the scheme, we will show that the adversary outputs an
additional message/signature pair in the last step with high probability showing that
both blindness and unforgeability cannot hold simultaneously for such constructions.
5.2.1 Similarities and Differences to the Work of Barak and
Mahmoody-Ghidary
From a technical point of view, our proof can be seen as the combination (plus some
extensions) of the two techniques of Barak and Mahmoody-Ghidary [BMG07, BMG09].
Our technique differs from [BMG07] in the following aspects:
Two-Party Protocol. The obvious difference is that we consider an interactive
signing protocol. In particular, this means that we have to consider two parties
querying the OWP rather than a single one. Barak and Mahmoody-Ghidary
consider deterministic signature scheme. Note that this assumption is in the case
of regular signature scheme not a restriction. Here, however, we cannot assume
that both parties are deterministic as blindness would no longer hold. As it turns
out, having a second party that queries the OWP simplifies the proof as in the
forgery game we basically learn only correct query/answer pairs from the user’s
side.
Usefulness Property. While we use the same “usefulness” property as in [BMG07],
our proof that usefulness holds is very different from the analogous proof in their
work: they assume a large message and argue that usefulness occurs for some pair
of messages with high probability, whereas in our case we rely on blindness and
show (roughly) that usefulness holds for any two messages with all but negligible
probability. This allows us to simplify the attack and obtain a forger that makes
only polynomially many oracle queries regardless of how many oracle queries the
construction uses. (In the work of Barak and Mahmoody-Ghidary the number of
queries made by the forger depends exponentially on the number of queries made
by the construction.)
5.3 Blind Signatures Relative to an Oracle
5.3.1 Definition of Blind Signatures
We define blind signatures with black-box security with respect to an oracle O. By
AO(x) we mean that an algorithm A on input x gets black-box access to O. To simplify
notation we often omit the oracle O, but it is understood that all algorithms have access
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to O. In the following, we consider blind signatures for 1-bit messages; since we are
proving impossibility, this only makes our results stronger.
Definition 5.3.1 (Oracle Blind Signature Scheme). An oracle blind signature scheme
is a tuple of polynomial-time algorithms BS = (KG(·), S(·), U (·), Vf(·)), where for any
oracle O:
Key Generation. The algorithm KGO(1n) for security parameter n generates a key
pair (sk, pk).
Signature Issuing. The joint execution of algorithm SO(sk) and algorithm UO(pk,m)
for message m ∈ {0, 1} generates an output σ for the user and no output for the
signer, we write this as (⊥, σ)← 〈SO(sk),UO(pk,m)〉.
Verification. The algorithm VfO(pk,m, σ) outputs a bit b.
We assume that the scheme has perfect completeness, i.e., for any n ∈ N, any (sk, pk)←
KGO(1n), any message m ∈ {0, 1}, and any signature σ output by UO in the joint
execution of SO(sk) and UO(pk,m), we have VfO(pk,m, σ) = 1.
5.3.2 Security of Blind Signatures with Respect to an Oracle
Recall that security of blind signature schemes consists of unforgeability and blindness
[JLO97b, PS96]. In this section, our definitions of security are weaker than those usually
considered; since we show impossibility, this only strengthens our results.
In the definitions that follow we consider an execution of an oracle blind signature
scheme BS relative to a random oracle O. Since a random oracle is one-way with over-
whelming probability, any construction of blind signatures from one-way functions must
give an oracle blind signature scheme satisfying these definitions. We remark that our
definitions consider unbounded adversaries who make polynomially many queries to O;
however, we could have stated our definitions in terms of polynomial-time adversaries
given access to an NP oracle.
Definition 5.3.2 (Secure Oracle Blind Signature Scheme). An oracle blind sig-
nature scheme BS = (KGO,
〈SO,UO〉 ,VfO) is secure if the following two properties
hold:
Unforgeability. For any semi-honest algorithm U∗O that invokes a single signature-
issue protocol on the message 1 and that makes at most poly(n) queries to the
oracle O, the probability that experiment ForgeBSU∗O(n) evaluates to 1 is negligible
(in n), where
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Experiment ForgeBSU∗(n):
Oracle O : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n is chosen at random
(sk, pk)← KGO(1n)
(σ0, σ1)← U∗〈S(sk),·〉,O(pk) (where U∗ runs an honest execution
of U(pk, 0) with S and then outputs signatures of its choice)
Return 1 iff VfO(pk, 0, σ0) = 1 and VfO(pk, 1, σ1) = 1.
Blindness. For any semi-honest algorithm S∗O (working in modes issue and guess)
that makes at most poly(n) queries to O, the probability that the following exper-
iment UnblindBSS∗O(n) evaluates to 1 is negligibly close to 1/2, where
Experiment UnblindBSS∗O(n)
Oracle O : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n is chosen at random
r ← {0, 1}n
b← {0, 1}
(sk, pk)← KGO(1n; r)
stissue ← S∗〈·,UO(pk,b)〉
1
,〈·,UO(pk,1−b)〉1,O(issue, sk, pk, r) (where S∗ runs
an honest execution of the protocol with each instance of U)
and let σb, σ1−b denote the local outputs
of UO(pk,mb) resp. UO(pk,m1−b).
set (σ0, σ1) = (⊥,⊥) if σ0 = ⊥ or σ1 = ⊥
b∗ ← S∗O(guess, σ0, σ1, stissue)
return 1 iff b = b∗.
We say an oracle blind signature scheme BS(·) is a black-box construction from one-way
functions if for every O that is one-way it holds that BSO is secure.
5.3.3 Simplifying assumptions
To prove our result we make the following simplifying assumptions.
Deterministic signer. We assume that the signing algorithm is deterministic. Note
that this is not a restriction as a blind signature scheme with randomized signer S
can always be converted to a scheme with deterministic signer S ′ by (1) including
a key for a pairwise-independent hash function as part of the signer’s private
key (see page 29) ; (2) having the user send a random nonce as its first message
in the signing protocol; and then (3) having S ′ apply the hash function to the
user’s first message to generate random coins that it then uses to run S.
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Perfect completeness. In Section 5.4 we will only consider signature schemes
achieving perfect completeness. We will show how to relax this requirement and
rule out schemes with imperfect completeness in Section 5.5.1.
5.4 Attacking Black-Box Constructions of Blind
Signatures
In this section we show that there is no black-box construction of blind signatures
from one-way functions. To this end, we describe a cheating user U∗ who wins in
the unforgeability game when the security of the blind signature scheme depends on a
random function oracle O : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n. This rules out such constructions since
such an oracle is one-way with overwhelming probability.
In the following we assume that the protocol proceeds in some fixed number of rounds.
We also assume w.l.o.g. that no party queries O twice on the same input. We say that
any message sent from one party to the other party is a move. W.l.o.g. we assume that
the signer sends all even moves and the user all odd ones.
5.4.1 Preliminaries — Notation and Oracles
We assume that O is a random oracle O : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n that on input x outputs
the value O(x). Let BS be an oracle blind signature scheme. For messages (0, 1), let
trans0 (resp. trans1) be a transcript of the execution with U(pk, 0) (resp. with U(pk, 1)),
and let σ0 (resp. σ1) be a corresponding signatures. Let Q(Vf(0)) (resp. Q(Vf(1)))
denote the set of O queries made by the verification algorithm VfO(pk, 0, σ0) (resp.
VfO(pk, 1, σ1)). Finally, let Q(S0) (resp. Q(S1)) be the set of queries asked by the
signer when interacting with U(pk, 0) (resp. U(pk, 1)).
5.4.2 The Algorithm Findδ
Before proposing our attacker, we review a necessary lemma from Barak and Mahmoody-
Ghidary [BMG09]. Informally, it states that for any two-party protocol where each
party has access to a random oracle there exists an algorithm that, upon observing
the transcript of the interaction, finds with high probability all the intersection queries
(queries that have been asked by both parties). This result was first discovered by
Impagliazzo and Rudich [IR89], and a more efficient protocol was given by Barak and
Mahmoody-Ghidary [BMG09]. Formally, this result is given in the following lemma.
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Lemma 5.4.1 ([BMG09]). Let Π be a two-party (randomized) protocol where each
party (Alice or Bob) asks at most q oracle queries to a random oracle. Then for every
0 < δ < 1, there is an algorithm Findδ that has access to the messages sent between
Alice and Bob and asks at most (10
4q2
δ2
) oracle queries such that the queries made by
Findδ contain all the intersection queries of Alice and Bob with probability at least 1−δ.
We apply this lemma to the scenario of blind signatures defining the protocol Π as
follows: Corresponding to any oracle blind signature scheme BS(·), define the following
two-party protocol Π between a signer S and a user U :
1. S runs (sk, pk)← KGO(1n) and sends pk to U .
2. U and S then run the signature-issuing protocol on the message 1, at the end of
which U obtains a signature σ0.
3. U runs VfO(pk, 0, σ0).
For the remainder of Section 5.4, fix some δ and define Findδ (as per Lemma 5.4.1)
relative to the above protocol Π. Say the above protocol is run in the presence of
a random oracle O. If we let Q(SΠ) and Q(UΠ) denote the O-queries made by each
party during an execution of the above protocol that resulted in transcript trans, then
Lemma 5.4.1 guarantees that, with high probability, that the set I contains all the
intersection queries, i.e.,
Q(S) ∩Q(U) ⊆ I,
Since the protocol Π is fixed, we omit this additional input in the following, i.e.,
Findδ(trans) := Findδ(Π, trans). Note that the message in Π is fixed, but the tran-
script might correspond to a different message. Due to the blindness, however, the
success probability of the algorithm Findδ is independent of the transcript.
5.4.3 From Blindness to Usefulness
In this section we study the question of what blindness means with respect to the set
of intersection queries. The main observation is that due to blindness the set I that
contains all intersection queries must be somehow “independent” of the message. Recall
that in the blindness game the semi-honest signer first outputs a public key together
with two messages. Then, it interacts with two honest user instances in a random
order. The task for the attacker is to predict which user had which message as input.
Recall that the algorithm Findδ (see Section 5.4.2) gets as input a transcript (i.e., all
the messages exchanged between both parties) of a protocol execution and outputs a
set that contains all intersection queries.
76
Now, consider two protocol executions and suppose that the set of intersection queries
depends on the message. Then just by looking at these queries it is possible to determine
the order of the messages. To formalize this intuition, consider a (semi-honest) signer S∗
in the blindness game. Since the attacker is semi-honest and by perfect completeness,
the user instances get a valid signature. Then, the adversary obtains both signatures in
the original order together with the transcripts of both executions. We now show that
the set of queries that the verification algorithm makes to verify the second message 1
are already contained in the intersection queries of the first execution. We write Im, to
indicate the set output when Findδ is run on the protocol execution 〈S(sk),U(pk,m)〉.
In the blindness game, where the message being signed is unknown, we use trans0 to
indicate the transcript of the first protocol execution 〈S(sk),U(pk,mb)〉. trans1 is defined
similarly for the second execution. We let I0 ← Findδ(trans0) and define I1 similarly.
We also define the sets Q(S0) and Q(S1) similarly for the queries made by the signer.
We now show that due to blindness all the intersection queries that occur when signing
the message 1 are contained in the set I0. That is, in the language of [BMG07], we
show that 0 is “useful” for 1.
Lemma 5.4.2. Let BS be an oracle blind signature scheme satisfying blindness. Con-
sider an execution of the blindness experiment (cf. Definition 5.3.2), and let Q(KG),
Q(Sb), transb, and Q(Vfb) be as defined above. Then with probability at least 1 − δ −
negl(n) over the random coins of the experiment it holds that
Q(Vf1) ∩ (Q(KG) ∪Q(S0)) ⊆ Findδ(trans0).
Proof. We first observe that with probability at least 1− δ we have
Q(Vf1) ∩ (Q(KG) ∪Q(S1)) ⊆ Findδ(trans1).
This follows immediately from Lemma 5.4.1 and our definition of protocol Π in the
previous section.
Consider now the following adversary S∗:
1. S∗ runs the honest key-generation algorithm to obtain (sk, pk). It records the
O-queries Q(KG) made during this step.
2. S∗ then runs the honest signing protocol with the first user instance. Let trans
denote the transcript of this execution, and let Q(S) denote the O-queries made
during this step.
3. S∗ then runs the honest signing protocol with the second user instance.
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4. S∗ is given signatures σ0, σ1 on the messages 0 and 1, respectively. (By perfect
completeness, both user instances always obtain valid signatures.) S∗ verifies σ1
and records the O-queries Q(Vf1) made in doing so.
5. Finally, S∗ outputs 1 iff Q(Vf1) ∩ (Q(KG) ∪Q(S)) ⊆ Findδ(trans).
If b = 1, and so the first user instance represents an interaction with U(pk, 1), then
trans = trans1 andQ(S) = Q(S1) and so S∗ outputs 1 with probability at least 1−δ. The
blindness property thus implies that S∗ outputs 1 with probability at least 1−δ−negl(n)
when b = 0 (and the first user instance represents an interaction with U(pk, 0)). This
concludes the proof.
5.4.4 Forging a Signature
Before presenting our forger, we begin by discussing the ideas behind our attack. The
main observation is that due to the blindness of the signature scheme the intersection
queries between the signer and user are somehow “independent” of the message. This
was formalized in Lemma 5.4.2, where we showed that (with high probability)
Q(Vf1) ∩ (Q(KG) ∪Q(S0)) ⊆ Findδ(trans0).
Intuitively, this means that all the “important” queries needed to verify a signature on
the message ‘1’ must already be contained in the set of queries that are found when
signing and verifying the message ‘0’. Thus, in the language of Barak and Mahmoody-
Ghidary [BMG07], we have shown that 0 is “useful” for 1 with high probability. As in
that paper, we use that property to show an attack.
The above condition seems to suggest that the set of intersection queries for ‘0’ is
sufficient to generate a signature on ‘1’. However, this is not quite true. The problem
is that there may be queries that the user makes with high probability when generating
and verifying a signature for 1 that are not in the set Findδ(trans0); this could cause
technical problems because our forger must get the answers to these queries right when
constructing a forged signature. For a concrete example, consider a blind signature
scheme where the user, on input a message b, always queries y = O(b) and includes y
as part of the signature; verification checks whether O(b) = y (among other things). In
such a case the query O(1) may not be in the set Findδ(trans0).
As in [BMG07], we handle this issue by introducing a phase in which the forger makes
any “heavy” queries that are made by the user with high probability. If the forger
knows the correct answers to all these high-probability queries then it is very unlikely
that it will incorrectly answer some query asked during the verification of the forged
signature.
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Given this intuition we now present the details of the attack. The main structure of the
attack is based on [BMG07] with necessary changes to adapt the proof to our setting.
In particular, our attack makes only polynomially many oracle queries (regardless of
the number of queries the scheme itself makes).
Theorem 5.4.3. Let BS be an oracle blind signature scheme (with perfect complete-
ness) where each party has access to a random oracle. Let q = poly(n) be an upper bound
on the number of oracle queries made by KG, S, U , and Vf. Then there exists an adver-
sary which makes at most poly(n) queries and breaks the unforgeability of the scheme
with non-negligible probability, where the probability is taken over the randomness of the
oracle, key generation, and the randomness of the adversary.
Proof. To prove this theorem we first describe the attacker and analyze its success
probability afterwards.
The attacker. Our adversary U∗ works as follows:
Setup: Key Generation. The input of the attacker U∗ is a public-key pk. It picks
random values r0 ← {0, 1}n and r1 ← {0, 1}n.
Step 1: Requesting a Signature. The adversary U∗ engages in an interactive sign-
ing protocol with the external signing oracle on the message 0. U∗ executes the
honest user algorithm U(pk, 0; r0) obtaining a valid signature σ0. U∗ then verifies
the received signature (observing the oracle queries made by the verification).
Let trans0 be the transcript (not including the randomness r0) of this protocol
execution. U∗ then computes the set I0 ← Findδ(trans0). Remember, that by
the properties of Findδ the set I0 contains all the intersection queries made by
the signer (including key generations) and user (including verification) for this
signature. Next, denote by T0 the complete transcript of the algorithm run so far.
I.e., we assume that T0 contains the secret key sk, public key pk, the message-
signature pair (0, σ0), the randomness r0 of the user and all query-answer pairs
made by the key generation Q(KG), the signer Q(S), and the user Q(U). Note
that since the user verifies the generated signature, the set Q(U) includes the
queries asked by verification Q(Vf(0)). Note further that the attacker U∗ has
only partial knowledge of T0.
Step 2: Learning Query/Answer Pairs. Let L0 be the information that U∗ has
about T0 and the oracle O following Step 1. This includes pk, 0, r0, σ0, Q(U0) and
I0. Let q be an upper bound on the number of queries asked by each of the BS
protocols and let δ = 1/10 be the failure probability of the algorithm Findδ. Let
 = δ/q and M = q/δ = 100q2. For i = 1, . . . ,M do the following:
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1. Let Di−1 be the distribution of T0, the transcript of the first step, conditioned
on only knowing Li−1.
2. Denote by Q(Li−1) the oracle queries that appear in Li−1. If a query x ∈
{0, 1}`\Q(Li−1) appears with probability at least  in Di−1, then U∗ makes
this query to O and adds the query/answer pair to Li. If there is more than
one such query, then he adds the lexicographically first one.
Step 3: Sampling a Possible Transcript. U∗ samples a random transcript T˜0
according to the distribution DM . Observe that T˜0 also defines a secret key s˜k
that may be distinct from the real secret key sk. Moreover, T˜0 may include some
new mappings that were not defined in LM . These most likely will not match the
real oracle O. We let O˜ be the following oracle. If a query x appears in T˜0 then
O˜(x) returns the value contained in T˜0. Otherwise, O˜(x) = O(x).
Step 4: Forging. To forge a signature, U∗ runs the interactive signing protocol lo-
cally using s˜k and O˜, i.e., σ1 ←
〈
SO˜(s˜k),U O˜(pk, 1; r1)
〉
on the message 1. It then
verifies the signature σ1 for the message 1 using the real oracle O. If the signature
verifies, then U∗ outputs (σ0, σ1) and aborts otherwise.
The analysis. U∗ makes at most poly(n) = M + 104q2/δ2 + O(q) oracle queries:
M for the learning queries step, 104q2/δ2 for running Findδ, and O(q) for generating
and verifying the two signatures. We will argue that U∗ outputs a successful forgery
with probability at least 4/5 − δ − negl(n). To analyze the success probability of U∗
let Q˜(KG), Q˜(S) be the queries made by the key generation and the signer during the
computation of σ1. We denote by Q˜(U) the user’s queries to O˜ during the computation
of σ1. Note that our forger only initiated a single protocol execution with the signer
but returns two message/signature pairs. Since the forger runs the honest user protocol
in the first execution, (0, σ0) is a valid message/signature pair. Thus, U∗ wins in the
unforgeability game as long as VfO(pk, 1, σ1) = 1.
In the following we show that, with high probability, the verification algorithm on (1, σ1)
never asks a query on which the oracles O˜ and O disagree. But if the verification
algorithm does not ask such a query, it follows by the perfect completeness of the
signature scheme that (1, σ1) must verify as well.
Lemma 5.4.4. Let Q(Vf1) denote the set of oracle queries made when verifying the
signature σ1. Let Q˜(KG) and Q˜(S0) denote the set of oracle queries made by the key-
generation and signing algorithms, respectively, in the sampled transcript T˜0. Then with
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probability at least 4
5
− δ − negl(n) it holds that
Q(Vf(1)) ∩
(
Q˜(KG) ∪ Q˜(S0)
)
⊆ Findδ(trans0).
Lemma 5.4.4 implies Theorem 5.4.3. To see this, note that VfO˜(pk, 1, σ1) = 1 by
perfect completeness of the signature scheme. But the only queries on which O˜ and O
can possibly differ are queries in
(
Q˜(KG) ∪ Q˜(S0)
)
\Findδ(trans0). If verification makes
no such queries, then
VfO(pk, 1, σ1) = VfO˜(pk, 1, σ1) = 1.
Let E denote the event considered in Lemma 5.4.4. The proof of Lemma 5.4.4 follows
the proof in [BMG07]: we define a series of hybrid distributions where the first hybrid
corresponds to the invented transcript T˜0 and the transcript of the forger’s signature and
verification protocols for 1 and the last hybrid corresponds to the transcript produced
if all these procedures are executed with respect to the real oracle O. The biggest
difference between our proof and [BMG07] (among the other aspects mentioned in
Section 5.2.1) is in the proof of Claim 5.4.5, where we analyze the probability that
E happens in the last hybrid. We show that due to the blindness of the signature
scheme, event E holds for any pair of messages, and in particular the fixed messages 0
and 1. On the other hand, [BMG07] are only able to show that it is possible to find
two messages for which event E occurs by searching through exponentially many (in
the number of oracle queries made by the signature scheme) messages. This difference
allows our attack to be much more efficient than theirs and in particular, our attack
only needs polynomially many oracle queries.
Definition of Hybrid Distributions. We formally define four hybrid distributionsH0,
H1, H2, and H3 as follows:
H0. The first hybrid is the distribution (T˜0, T1), where T˜0 is the invented transcript
created by U∗ in Step 3 and T1 is the transcript of the signature issue and verifi-
cation protocols for 1 in Step 4. Note that T˜0 also includes the queries of the key
generation, while T1 does not.
H1. The second hybrid is defined identically to H0, except that we use O˜ to verify the
forger’s signature σ1. In H0, the O oracle is used instead.
H2. The third hybrid has the same distribution as H1, except that we change the
definition of O˜ as follows. Recall that LM is the set of O query/answer pairs that
U∗ knows after the learning queries step (Step 2). We define O˜ to answer any
query contained in LM with the answer stored there and all other queries with a
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randomly chosen value. This modification results in an oracle O˜ that agrees with
O on all the queries U∗ has asked from O until the end of Step 2 and all the other
queries are answered completely at random.
H3. The distribution of the last hybrid is the same as H2 except that T˜0 is replaced
with T0. Thus the output of this hybrid is (T0, T1) which describes the experiment
where (1) the keys are generated (sk, pk)← KG, (2) the signing algorithm uses sk
to run σ0 ←
〈SO(sk),UO(pk, 0; r0)〉 and σ1 ← 〈SO(sk),UO(pk, 1; r1)〉, and (3) the
verification algorithm uses pk to verify both signatures. Note that all algorithms
here use the “real” oracle O and thus verification succeeds for both signatures.
The distributions considered in each hybrid are taken over random choice of the oracle
and random coins of the key-generation algorithm, the signer, and the adversary. We
prove Lemma 5.4.4 by showing that (1) event E occurs with high probability in H3 and
(2) the probability that event E occurs in H0 is not much smaller than its probability
in H3.
We first show that E occurs with high probability in H3. The following is an immediate
consequence of Lemma 5.4.2.
Claim 5.4.5. PrH3 [E] ≥ 1− δ − negl(n).
We next show that the probability of E remains unchanged when we move from H3
to H2.
Claim 5.4.6. H2 ≡ H3. Thus, PrH2 [E] = PrH3 [E].
Proof. The proof here is the same as in [BMG07]. We can view H3 as being sampled
as follows: first, fix LM ; then choose the transcript T0 at random from DM . This,
however, is exactly the same distribution as H2 where LM is fixed and we then choose
T˜0 from DM .
For the next claim, we need the following definition.
Definition 5.4.7 (Statistical distance). If X, Y are two random variables taking
values in a finite set A, then SD(X, Y ) = 1/2 ·∑a∈A |Pr[X = a]− Pr[Y = a]| .
We now show that H1 and H2 are “close”.
Claim 5.4.8. SD(H1,H2) ≤ 1
5
. Thus, PrH1 [E] ≥ PrH2 [E]− 15 .
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Proof. Let Q(T0) be the queries contained in the transcript T0. Let B be the event that
U∗ ever asks a query in Q(T0)\Q(LM). It is clear that H1 = H2 as long as event B does
not occur in either of them, since in both distributions any queries outside of Q(T0) are
answered randomly. This implies that PrH1 [B] = PrH2 [B], and SD(H1,H2) ≤ PrH2 [B].
We now show that PrH2 [B] ≤ 15 . (In the following, all probabilities are in H2.)
Recall that in Step 2 of the attack, we set  = δ/q and U∗ learns at most M = 100q2
query/answer pairs from O. Let Di be the distribution of T0 sampled in this step by
U∗ given the set Li of known query/answer pairs. Let C be the event that there are
more than M queries that become likely during the attack. That is, C is the event that
there exists a query x /∈ Q(LM) such that x is asked in DM with probability at least .
Below, we show that Prob[C] ≤ δ = 1
10
and Pr[B | ¬C] ≤ δ = 1
10
. This completes the
proof, since then
Prob[B] = Prob[C] · Pr[B | C] + Prob[¬C] · Pr[B | ¬C]
≤ Prob[¬C] + Pr[B | ¬C] ≤ 2δ = 1
5
.
The following two claims complete the proof that H1 and H2 are close.
Claim 5.4.9. Let C be the event defined in the proof of the previous claim. Then
PrH2 [C] ≤ δ.
Proof. All probabilities here are in H2. Consider an arbitrary query x and let hitx be
the event that x is queried to O by the signer and then by the user when generating
the signature on ‘0’. Let qx = Pr[hitx]. Finally, let Ax(i) be the event that x is asked
in the ith iteration of Step 2; let px(i) = Pr[Ax(i)]; and let px = Pr[∪iAx(i)]. Note
that
∑
x qx ≤ q since q is an upper bound on the total number of queries asked when
running each algorithm of the blind signature scheme. Furthermore, qx ≥ px because
qx = Prob[hitx] ≥
∑
i
Prob[hitx |Ax(i) ] · Prob[Ax(i)] ,
and U∗ adds a query to its list only if the probability that this query is asked is at
least . Thus, Prob[hitx |Ax(i) ] ≥  and so qx ≥ 
∑
i Prob[Ax(i)] = px.
Assume for the sake of contradiction that Prob[C] > δ. Since C is the event that M
queries are learned in Step 2, this implies that the expected number of queries asked,∑
x px, is larger than δM . But this would imply
δM <
∑
x
px ≤
∑
x
qx/ ≤ q/,
contradicting the fact that M = q/δ.
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Claim 5.4.10. Let B and C be as defined earlier. Then PrH2 [B | ¬C] ≤ δ.
Proof. Recall that in Step 4 U∗ relies only on the mappings stored in LM , and all
queries from Q(T0)\Q(LM) are answered at random. But then H2 is independent of
T0 conditioned on LM (whereas LM has the distribution DM). This means that we can
imagine defining H2 by choosing LM first, then running U∗ (using LM) to sample H2,
and then choosing T0 conditioned on LM and H2. Recall that event C is determined by
LM , and assume that LM is such that event ¬C occurs. This implies that every query
asked by U∗ that is not in Q(LM) must appear in DM with probability less than .
Since U∗ asks at most q queries in Step 4, the probability that Q(T0)\Q(LM) contains
one of these queries is at most q = δ.
Finally, we show that E occurs with the same probability in H0 and H1.
Claim 5.4.11. PrH0 [E] = PrH1 [E].
Proof. This claim follows easily if both hybrid distributions H0 and H1 use the same
oracleO and if they are sampled using the same random coins for key generation and the
adversary (note that the randomness of the adversary fully determines the randomness
used to run the honest user algorithm during the signature-issue protocol). But then it
follows that event E occurs in H0 if and only if it also occurs in H1.
This completes the proof of Lemma 5.4.4, and thus the proof of Theorem 5.4.3.
5.5 Extensions
5.5.1 Imperfect Completeness
In this section we extend our impossibility result to schemes that are not perfectly
complete. That is, we assume that BS is a blind signature scheme that always accepts
an honestly generated signature with probability 1− negl(n).
Definition 5.5.1 (Imperfect Completeness). An oracle blind signature scheme σ
has imperfect completeness if with overwhelming probability in n ∈ N the following
holds: (sk, pk) ← KGO(1n), any message m ∈ {0, 1} and any σ output by UO in the
joint execution of SO(sk) and UO(pk,m) we have VfO(pk,m, σ) = 1.
The following Lemma is identical to Lemma 5.4.2, but it holds also for schemes that
have imperfect completeness.
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Lemma 5.5.2. Let BS be an oracle blind signature scheme and consider the blindness
game as defined in Definition 5.3.2. Let trans0 be the transcript corresponding to the sig-
nature issue protocol 〈S(sk),U(pk, 0)〉 and let I0 ← Findδ(trans0). Then the probability
that
Q(Vf(1)) ∩ (Q(KG) ∪Q(S0)) ⊆ I0
is at least 1− (δ + negl(n)) (where δ depends on Findδ and can be arbitrary small).
The proof of this lemma is essentially the same as the one of Lemma 5.4.2, but it differs
in the case that the attacker S∗ receives (⊥,⊥) instead of two signatures. This case
could not happen before as it never occurs in a scheme with perfect completeness. If
the algorithm S∗ gets such a pair, then it simply outputs a random bit. The analysis
then follows in a straightforward way because this event happens only with negligible
probability.
The forgery attack then proceeds just as in the case for perfect completeness. Since the
probability that one of the signatures fails is negligible, this possibility only affects the
forgery probability a negligible amount and thus we have the following theorem.
Theorem 5.5.3. Let BS be an oracle blind signature scheme that has imperfect com-
pleteness where each party has access to a random oracle. Let q = poly(n) be an upper
bound on the number of oracle queries made by KG, S, U , and Vf. Then there exists
an adversary which makes at most poly(n) queries and breaks the unforgeability of the
scheme with non-negligible probability, where the probability is taken over the random-
ness of the oracle, key generation, verification and the randomness of the adversary.
5.5.2 One-Way Permutations
We now show how to extend our impossibility result to also rule out constructions
from one-way permutations. We let O be a random permutation oracle that on input
x ∈ {0, 1}n returns a value f(x) where f is a random permutation over {0, 1}n. Since
using techniques from [IR89], the Findδ algorithm of [BMG09] can be modified to work
in the random permutation model (with a polynomial blow-up in the number of queries)
the blindness attack remains as before. For the forgery attack we prove the following
modified version of Theorem 5.4.3.
Theorem 5.5.4. Let BS be an oracle blind signature scheme for the message space
{0, 1} in the random permutation oracle. Let q = poly(n) be an upper bound on the
number of oracle queries made by KG, S, U , and Vf. Then there exists an adversary
which makes at most poly(n) queries and breaks the unforgeability of the scheme with
non-negligible probability, where the probability is taken over the randomness of the
oracle, key generation, and the randomness of the adversary.
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The proof of this theorem is analogous to the proof of Theorem 5.4.3 except for the
following modifications [BMG07]. Let N denote the number of oracle queries made
by the forger in Theorem 5.4.3. We change the random permutation oracle O into an
oracle O′ defined as follows. When O′ is queried on a value x, if |x| ≥ 2 logN then
we answer with O(x), otherwise we answer with a concatenation of all the values O(y)
for all y ∈ {0, 1}|x|, i.e. if |x| = n, O′(x) = O(0n)‖O(0n−11)‖ . . . ‖O(1n). Given this
modification we denote by BS′ = (KG′, 〈S ′,U ′〉 ,Vf ′) the blind signature scheme using
the modified oracle. The following lemma implies Theorem 5.5.4.
Lemma 5.5.5. Given the scheme BS′ = (KG′, 〈S ′,U ′〉 ,Vf ′), there exists an adversary
U∗ that breaks the scheme with probability 4
5
−O(1/poly(q)).
Proof. Lemma 5.5.5 implies Theorem 5.5.4 because we can simulate O′ for U∗ given
access to O. If U∗ makes at most N ′ queries, this simulation makes at most N ′ · N2
queries to O.
U∗ is identical to the forger presented in the proof of Theorem 5.4.3 except that we
need to deal with the case where we learn a query in O that outputs the same value as
an invented query in T˜0, thus contradicting the permutation property. Fortunately, we
show that this only happens with small probability so it does not affect our attack by
much.
To prove this lemma we define the same hybrid distributions H0,H1,H2, and H3 but
now we have to show that these distributions are closely distributed even once we
modify the attack. The only place where the proof changes is in comparing H1 and H2.
We prove that (analogously to Claim 5.4.8) SD(H1,H2) = 1
5
+ O(1/poly(q)). Recall
that these two hybrids differ only if U∗ queries a value x ∈ Q(T0)\Q(LM). Following
the analysis of Claim 5.4.8, such a query occurs with probability at most 1/5 (in both
experiments). Now, assume that U∗ does not make such a query.
In H1 when a query is asked during signing or verification it may output the same
answer as a guessed answer for a query x′ in T˜0 (event hit1). On the other hand, in H2
the answer to a query (again, during signing or verification) x is never equal to a query
T˜0 but it might be equal to one in Q(T0)\Q(LM) (event hit2).
Observe that (H1|¬hit1) ≡ (H2|¬hit2). Thus, to complete the proof, we show that
Prob[hiti] = O(1/poly(q)) for i = 1, 2 and therefore SD(H1,H2) = 15 + O(1/poly(q)).
This follows from the fact that U∗ makes N ′ queries and thus the answer to each query
is chosen from a set of size at least N2 − N ′. Thus, this query hits a previous answer
with probability at most N ′/(N2 −N ′) = O(1/poly(q)).
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